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Foreword 
 
 
This report is based on Daniel-M. Gouin’s work in 1994 when he was a visiting research 
officer at Lincoln University in New Zealand.  This report represents a summary of this work 
and updates the data reference. 
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Summary 
 
 
This research analyses the effects on the farm sector of the New Zealand agricultural policy 
reform undertaken in 1985.  The analysis is placed within a discussion of the larger issue of 
the specificity of the farm sector and whether this specificity requires special support from the 
state which often occur in most developed countries.  This study describes the crisis of the 
New Zealand economy at the beginning of the deregulation process and explains why the 
farm sector was at the centre of the reform.  The removal of state support to agriculture and 
the transition measures set in place are documented. The research analyses the effects of the 
dairy reform on farms both at the structural level and in terms of farm incomes.  The sheep 
and dairy sectors are also analysed in detail.  The analysis concludes that the farm sector has 
maintained its level of economic activity despite significant reductions in state support. 
Finally, this study discusses some lessons that can be learnt from the New Zealand 
experience, notably in relation with the specificity of the farm sector.  
 vi
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
The intervention of the state in the farm sector is currently being questioned in many 
developed countries.  The problems associated with balancing the public budget and the 
persistent crisis of low price of commodity products on the international markets has led to 
questions about the wisdom of subsidising the farm sector. Until now, agricultural policies 
have justified the intervention of the state by emphasising the specificity, or distinctiveness, 
of the farm sector in comparison to the other economic sectors. 
 
The farm sector is unique in the sense that it has some characteristics which lead to 
chronically low returns to the resources invested.  It is generally accepted that the demand for 
most agricultural products is price inelastic in developed countries. Also, the income elasticity 
of demand is low for agricultural products.  This means that an increase in the level of 
production results in a decrease in gross income. 
 
The supply of agricultural products fluctuates in the short term but is generally maintained in 
the long term.  In the short term, the supply is often cyclic and this can be explained by the 
“cobweb theorem”.  This theorem is based on three conditions: “that price in the market is 
determined by the supply available; that producers’ output in the next production period is 
solely determined by price in the current period; and that production conditions are such that 
there is a time period between current prices and output response” Hathaway (1963).  These 
three conditions explain the continual fluctuations in agricultural product prices that affect the 
returns.  Also in the short term, production variations caused by climatic events adds to the 
sector’s instability. 
 
In contrast, in the long term, supply is generally maintained. Technological progress 
facilitates reduced cost and increases supply at the individual level.  As technological progress 
spreads, prices will decrease with the increase in supply, and the returns will go back at their 
initial level.  This is the model of the Agricultural Treadmill elaborated by Cochrane (1958).  
Technological progress is a continuous process, so a temporary disequilibrium caused by 
technological progress in the farm sector can become a permanent state.  This situation is 
accentuated by the fact that in the farm sector there is often lack of asset mobility, and change 
of production is costly and takes a long time.  When considering leaving farming, the rural 
unemployment rate, the qualifications of labour and attachment to the profession are factors 
that reduce mobility.  As a consequence, farmers would accept a drop in their standard of 
living in order to stay in farming even if the economic terms deteriorate.  Their own assets, 
capital and labour often do not need to be remunerated at the market rate.  Thus, farmers have 
some capacity to resist lower levels of price and returns. 
 
In addition to these economic explanations, the traditional intervention of the state in the farm 
sector arises from historical conditions. The importance of farming for employment, territorial 
occupation, and food security are elements that have justified the elaboration of agricultural 
policy in many developed countries.  Thus, in most developed countries there are a set of 
policies with the objective of stabilising and supporting prices and incomes in the farm sector. 
 
However, the view that the specificity of the farm sector justifies special intervention by the 
state is increasingly questioned. The inclusion of the farm sector in the last GATT 
negotiation, the Uruguay Round, shows already a certain will from member countries to 
reduce support to the farm sector and to expose it more to market forces.  The results of this 
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round of negotiations do not mean a dismantling of either agricultural policies and programs 
or of all trade barriers, but it is a first step in this direction.  Nevertheless, the principle that 
the farm sector should be treated like other commodities or industrial goods sectors in the 
multilateral negotiations is now accepted.  There is no doubt that the next round of GATT 
negotiations will include a reduction in state intervention in this sector. 
 
The specificity of the farm sector is also questioned by the New Zealand case with its 
significant reduction of state support.  Prior to the conclusion of the Uruguay Round this 
country had undertaken and nearly completed the reform of its agricultural programs and 
policies.  From a level of public expenses of more than one billion $NZ in 1984/85, the 
amount of the New Zealand budget assigned to the agricultural sector dropped to less then 
$NZ200 million in 1992/93.  The New Zealand case is the “model” that could prove that the 
farm sector is not perhaps so specific or, at the very least, that its specificity does not justify a 
special intervention from state. 
 
But what about the outcomes of the New Zealand agricultural policy reform?  The main 
objective of this research is to examine the effects of the abolition of agricultural subsidies on 
the New Zealand farm sector. 
 
Chapter 2 presents macro-economic data on the New Zealand economy in order to show the 
crisis of this economy at the beginning of the deregulation process.  It is useful to place the 
reform of agricultural policy in perspective by explaining the global economic context in 
which it took place. 
 
Chapter 3 concerns the reform of the agricultural policy. Key questions are: which programs 
have been reformed and at what rate, and what types of production have been affected?  It is 
also necessary to document the transition measures that were used to allow the farm sector to 
adapt to the new economic environment. 
 
The results of this reform of agricultural policy are analysed in Chapters 4 and 5. It is relevant 
to investigate first at an aggregate level how the production sector was affected.  Three major 
elements are involved: the level of production, the level of exports (essential to the New 
Zealand economy as we will see), and the structural changes to the farm sector.  In Chapter 5, 
at a more micro-economic level, the change in farm incomes following the abolition of 
subsidies is analysed. This analysis considers the relative effects of the abolition of support on 
farm incomes and other variables such as export prices, exchange rate and production costs. 
 
Finally, in Chapter 6, it is considered what can be learnt from the agricultural policy reform in 
New Zealand.  In particular, the question of the specificity of the farm sector and the necessity 
of special intervention by the state in this sector is discussed in the light of the results from the 
analysis in the preceding chapters. 
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Chapter 2 
The Crisis of Regulation in the New Zealand Economy 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
It is thought that the agricultural reforms in New Zealand did not result from a singularly 
dogmatic stand on the non-specificity of the farm sector.  Although the reforms question this 
specificity, it was mainly for other reasons that they were undertaken.  In fact, it was more a 
crisis of regulation in the New Zealand economy as a whole that led to the removal of most of 
the subsidies to the farm sector.  It was by necessity, that the agricultural sector was so 
severely affected by the New Zealand economic reforms.  Obviously, we could question the 
necessity of applying such drastic cuts to agricultural subsidies, or the degree of state 
intervention which was or could have been maintained, but this is not our main objective.  
The aim of the present chapter is to document the crisis situation causing regulation in the 
New Zealand economy and explain why the farm sector was at the front line of the decrease 
in public expenditure. 
 
2.2 The origin of the crisis 
 
The balance of payments represents a primary indicator of the health of the New Zealand 
economy.  New Zealand has a small population of about 4 million people today, and has at all 
times based its economic development on exports to other countries.  Thus exports were a key 
element of economic national development. At the same time, a population relatively low in 
numbers does not provide a domestic consumption basis on which national industry can 
sustain development.  However, an equilibrium was maintained between the value of exports 
and imports during the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s.  Thus, from 1960 to 1974 the 
balance of payments was relatively stable, in absolute value as well as in percentage of gross 
domestic product (see Figure 2.1). 
 
The 1970s were characterised by three major shocks from international markets.  In the first 
case, the entry of the United Kingdom into the EEC in 1973 partially closed access to 
traditional markets for New Zealand agricultural products.  Exports to the United Kingdom 
were 31 per cent of total New Zealand exports in 1972, but five years later they were 20 per 
cent of the total1.  Secondly, there were relative shortages on the international cereal markets 
which temporarily carried the prices of agricultural products to historic highs.  This provided 
New Zealand with a positive balance of payments from 1972 to 1974.  Thirdly, the petrol 
shocks had important repercussions on the New Zealand economy, which was entirely 
dependent on importation of fuel.  With the fall in farm prices and the increase in the cost of 
petrol imports, the balance of payments deteriorated seriously.  From a historic low of 13.5 
per cent of GDP in 1975, it gradually recovered by 1979.  But the second petrol shock, 
followed by the economic recession at the beginning of the 1980s, provoked a new drop in the 
balance of payments as a percentage of GDP. 
 
                                                 
1 New Zealand has had no other choice than to continue to diversify its export destinations. As of 1991, United 
Kingdom markets took no more than 6.5 per cent of New Zealand exports. In terms of farm products, the United 
Kingdom imported 73 per cent of the butter output and 80 per cent of lamb output in 1972. In 1991, these figures 
had decreased by 40 per cent for butter and 31 per cent for lamb meat (taken from the Department of Statistics, 
Overseas Trade). 
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Figure 2.1  Current account balance of payments, New Zealand, 1960-2004  
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Sources: Our calculations and Balance of payment: until 1965: Department of Statistics, Overseas 
Balance of Payment. From 1966 to 2004: Department of Statistics, PCInfos ECON-1.01, 
BOPQ.STOT168., BOPA.S5AC3. 
 
In current dollars, the balance of payments has had an average deficit in the order of $800 
million in 1980 and 1981 and of two $billion each year in 1983 and 1984, the year in which 
economic reforms began. 
 
Parallel to the deterioration in the balance of payments, the unemployment rate began to 
increase (see Figure 2.2).  It stayed at under one per cent until the end of the 1970s and it was 
only after 1974 that it began to increase to exceed two per cent in 1980.  Although relatively 
weak, a two per cent unemployment rate was considered abnormal in a country used to full 
employment. 
Figure 2.2 Unemployment rate, New Zealand, 1970-2004  
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Sources: Department of Statistics, PCInfos OECD-C5-NZL-Y.NZL.UNR.(1970-1985) and LFQ.S1F3S 
(December 1986-2004) 
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2.3 A keynesian reaction to the economic crisis 
 
To counteract the deficit in external trade and to try to maintain a level of full employment, 
the government chose to end the 1970s, in the Keynesian tradition, with a marked expansion 
of public investment in large-scale industrial projects (the ‘Think Big’ projects).  These 
projects included among others “the electrification of the North Island railway line, the 
establishment of a synthetic fuel plant, construction of a nitrogen fertiliser plant, expansion of 
the oil refinery, etc.” (Sheppard and Lattimore 1993).  These were seen as “being ‘too large’ 
for conventional private investment and this was therefore replaced by direct government 
investment” (Sheppard and Lattimore 1993). 
 
Simultaneously, the government made the decision to encourage the development of 
agricultural production through specific programmes in order to increase the level of 
agricultural exports and improve the balance of payments (Griffith and Martin 1988).  The 
first part of these government programmes consisted of direct contribution of public funds to 
stimulate productive investment in the farm sector.  The second part of the programmes 
complemented the first, providing stabilisation of farm incomes in order to secure farmers’ 
expectations regarding their investment in the sector2.  The main aim of the New Zealand 
policy was to increase production to provide a bigger exportable surplus (Ross and Sheppard 
1990). 
 
For the New Zealand government, the improvement of the balance of payments was to be 
derived from the agricultural sector.  This is explained by the historical importance of the 
agricultural sector in the New Zealand economy. On average, the agricultural sector counted 
for more than 10 per cent of the gross domestic product (GDP) of the country3 in the 1970s.  
Although decreasing over the years (see Figure 2.3), the contribution to GDP from agriculture 
stays at a generally higher level compared to that in other developed countries4. 
 
                                                 
2 These programmes are explained in detail in Chapter 3. 
3 If the total farm production sector is taken and not only the agricultural sector, the contribution to GDP was 
16.9 per cent in 1982 and 12.2 per cent in 1991 (MAF 1992). 
4 In OECD countries, the contribution of agriculture to GDP is generally less than four per cent (taken from 
OECD, Economic Surveys, diverse countries and years). 
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Figure 2.3  Contribution of farm sector to GDP, New Zealand, 1972-2002  
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Sources: agricultural GDP from 1972 to 1977, New Zealand Official Yearbook, various years; total GDP 
and Agricultural GDP, PCInfos, ECON-1.11, SNBA.SF9AA; Situation and Outlook for New Zealand 
Agriculture and Forestry 2004, p.127 and MAF website, Table 8, Contribution to GDP by selected Industry 
and Production Group (1994/1995). Agricultural GDP, The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 
2001/2005 (1996 to 2004 in 95-96 constant $). GDP (in constant price): 96 to 2004 - The Economist 
Intelligence Unit 2001 and 2005 and our calculations. 
 
The importance of the agrifood5 sector to total exports explains the emphasis put on the 
development of agricultural production to improve the country’s balance of payments.  
Exports from the agrifood sector accounted for more than 90 per cent of the total value of the 
country's exports from the beginnings of the l970s (see Figure 2.4).  From the time of starting 
the agricultural development programmes to the end of the 1970s, three quarters of total 
exports were from the agrifood sector.  Despite a continuing decline in the agrifood share of 
sector exports, these represent more than 50 per cent of total exports6 today. 
 
                                                 
5 We define the agrifood sector to include farming and all the farm product processing sectors. 
6 This relative decline of agrifood exports, even if they have increased by 170 per cent from 1980 to 1993, is 
explained by a bigger growth of total exports, at around 250 per cent for the same period, all in current dollars 
(source: data of the Figure 2.4 in current dollar). 
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Figure 2.4  Agrifood sector as a percentage of total exports, New Zealand, 1970-2004  
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Source: Total exports, Department of Statistics, Overseas Trade 1992, cat. 010170092; Food exports, 
MAF, New Zealand Agricultural Statistics until 1981 and MAF, Situation and Outlook for New Zealand 
Agriculture; and our calculations. 
 
In fact, historically the economic development of New Zealand has been based on agricultural 
revenues and exports, as explained by Ross and Sheppard (1990): 
 
Since the early 1870s, as gold production declined, the agricultural sector has 
been the main contributor to the country's export income… The external 
account has always played a dominant role in the New Zealand economy, with 
strong growth and high levels of activity being experienced during periods 
when receipts were high, and recession or stagnation resulting from low 
receipts ...  Sustainable receipts are based on exports, and since the 1870s these 
have been dominated by payments for agricultural commodities. The 
agricultural industry has therefore played a key role in the development of the 
New Zealand economy. 
 
Until relatively recently, the industrial sector has focused on supplying internal markets and 
was protected by import controls.  This protection policy was put in place in the 1930s and 
was based on the “infant industry” argument that had been in vogue for 50 years until the 
1980s (Lattimore 1985).  Lattimore explains this argument: 
 
This school of thought argued, and still argues, that balanced economic 
development requires initial import protection. In New Zealand’s case, 
balanced development was taken to mean expanding the manufacturing sector 
principally by drawing capital and labour resources out of agriculture.  Tariffs 
and other import restrictions achieved this by providing a subsidy to the import 
substitute segment of manufacturing and other sectors (in the form of the tariff) 
and an implicit tax on the whole export sector in the form of higher cost inputs 
purchased from the rest of the economy. 
 
But for Lattimore and many other analysts, this argument does not hold and the objective of 
allowing the development of a national industrial capacity has not been attained in New 
Zealand.  Lattimore continues: 
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While it has yet to be proven, there is growing evidence in New Zealand that the 
import substitution bias which has existed since the 1930s has hindered industrial 
development, stimulated foreign ownership, reduced employment growth and 
reduced real income.  These results would be expected if New Zealand's trading 
environment were that of a small country and the domestic market alone offers 
few (if any) opportunities to exploit economies of size…  It appears as if the 
manufacturing sector completely missed the opportunity to participate in the world 
trade growth in manufacturers of the 1950s and 1960s, in part because of the high 
disincentive to produce for export (Lattimore 1987). 
 
In any case, the presence of such political control of imports, whether adequate or not, 
represented a supplementary justification for the implementation of specific programmes to 
subsidise the agricultural sector.  The agricultural sector then faced increased costs from the 
input industries and the different programmes of support compensated for this rise in 
production costs (Rayner 1980). 
 
The New Zealand government then engaged in large-scale measures to resolve the deficit of 
the balance of payment and tried to maintain full employment with large-scale industrial 
projects and development programmes for agriculture. The results for the overall economic 
situation were not what was expected: “the outcome included a major growth in overseas debt 
as the government borrowed to finance the ‘Think Big’ projects and it included a continuing 
deficit in the balance of payments as demand for raw materials imports coupled with 
continued consumer demand for imported finished goods … was not matched by increased 
demand and return for export products” (Sheppard and Lattimore 1993).  From 1978 to 1984, 
the balance of payments continued to decline, as is shown in Figure 2.1.  At the same time the 
unemployment rate which did not reach two per cent in 1978, progressively increased to 
exceed five per cent in 1983, as shown in Figure 2.2. 
 
2.4 Public debt out of control 
 
An unfavourable current account balance and an increase in public debt led to a permanent 
and increasing deficit in the government budget.  As a percentage of GDP, the budget deficit 
had been maintained at a relatively stable level between two per cent and four per cent from 
1960 to 1975.  From 1976 the situation deteriorated; the deficit was very variable but there 
was an overall gradual increase to more than six per cent of GDP in 1982 and to nine per cent 
in 19847. 
 
In these conditions, the total New Zealand debt could only grow in absolute value and as a 
percentage of GDP (see Figures 2.5 and 2.6).  In the mid-1970s, at the time of the petroleum 
crisis, the New Zealand public debt was around 40 per cent of GDP.  Since that time, the level 
of public debt in current dollars increased rapidly and increased by nearly six times between 
1974 and 1984.  The increased indebtedness was more rapid than the overall growth in the 
economy with public debt surpassing 63 per cent of GDP in 1984.  This level was no higher 
than in the beginning of the 1960s but the structure of the New Zealand debt changed 
drastically. From 1960 to 1974, New Zealanders borrowed more than 80 per cent of their debt 
from the domestic market but in 1984 around 40 per cent of the debt was financed by 
international markets.  Thus, at the beginning of reforms in 1984, the overseas public debt 
reached 24 per cent of GDP8 and was likely to increase further. 
                                                 
7 Dalziel and Lattimore, 1991 and Appendix to the Journal of the House of Representatives Document B6, 
Tables 2 and 2A. 
8 The total overseas debt, including the private sector, reached 48 per cent of GDP in 1984 Wallace (1990). 
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Figure 2.5  Total public debt in current dollars, New Zealand, 1960-2002  
0
10,000
20,000
30,000
40,000
50,000
60 63 66 69 72 75 78 81 84 87 90 93 96 99 02
Overseas Domestic
$ millions 
  
Source: New Zealand Official Yearbook, various years; NZ Pocket Digest of Statistics, cat. 
01.101.0091; Department of Statistics, PCInfos: ECON-6.03-CGSA.SS and ECON-6.03A-CGSA.SJR; 
Public Debt History of New Zealand, New Zealand Debt Management Office (total debt, 1994 to 
2004); The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited (various years) and our calculations. 
 
The New Zealand economic situation became unsustainable and inflation increased rapidly 
(see Figure 2.7).  From 1974 to 1984, the Consumer Price Index increased 250 per cent with 
an annual inflation of between 11 and 17 per cent.  It was only with a freeze on prices and 
wages that the inflation rate was artificially maintained at the level of 7.4 per cent and 6.1 per 
cent respectively for 1983 and 1984. 
 
The New Zealand economy was performing poorly as was demonstrated in the change in 
GDP which showed only a very weak increase in real terms (see Figure 2.8).  From 1975 to 
1984, the GDP was almost stagnant with a slight increase of 8.5 per cent for the whole period.  
In comparison to other industrialised countries, the economic performance of New Zealand 
was lagging behind.  Thus, for the 1975 to 1984 period, the average rate of annual increase of 
GDP in constant US dollars was only 0.6 per cent in New Zealand compared to 2 per cent in 
small OECD countries and 2.7 per cent for all OECD countries (calculations taken from 
OECD 1990). 
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Figure 2.6  Total public debt as percentage of GDP, New Zealand, 1960-2002  
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Source: New Zealand Official Yearbook, various years; NZ Pocket Digest of Statistics, cat. 
01.101.0091; Department of Statistics, PCInfos: ECON-6.03-CGSA.SS and ECON-6.03A-CGSA.SJR; 
Public Debt History of New Zealand, New Zealand Debt Management Office (total debt, 1994 to 
2004); The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited (various years) and our calculations. 
 
Figure 2.7  Annual percentage change in CPI, New Zealand, 1961-2004  
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Figure 2.8  GDP in real terms, New Zealand, 1960-2004  
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Source: GDP, New Zealand Official Yearbook and PCInfos: ECON-1.11, SNBA.SF9AA; IPC, 
Department of Statistics, PCInfos: ECON-3.02, CPIQ.SE9A; and our calculations. 
 
The economic indicators all converge to show the significance of the economic crisis which 
hit the New Zealand economy.  Rayner reviewed the state of the economy in 1984: 
 
The state of the economy itself was such that action had to be taken.  Ongoing 
inefficiencies were still largely present and, in addition, a number of acute 
problems had to be addressed.  Overseas debt was extremely large, and the 
fiscal debt had reached proportions that were imposing ever larger servicing 
burdens on taxpayers. Inflation was under control, but only through the 
expedient of a price freeze… Unemployment continued to grow and the 
economy to stagnate, apart from the temporary improvements to both resulting 
from massive expenditure on the ‘Think Big’ projects (Rayner 1990). 
 
For Rayner, this decline in the total economic situation required a major reform of 
government intervention in the economy, a reform which has been in effect since 1984: 
 
It was apparent to many economists and voters alike that there would have to 
be a major policy change.  The alternative of further interventions as a solution 
to the problems of the economy had been tried to an extreme and had 
demonstrably failed.  The costs of these policies were becoming clear and 
there were few who could believe that the solution was simply more of the 
same (Rayner 1990). 
 
The analysis of Sheppard and Lattimore is no different to that of Rayner:  “The government 
deficit rose steeply at this time to a peak of 9.1 per cent of GDP in the 1983/84 year and it 
became obvious that fundamental changes were required in total government policy” 
(Sheppard and Lattimore 1993).  The regulation of the New Zealand economy was in crisis. 
 
2.5 The farm sector at the front line of economic reform 
 
The important historical role of the farm sector in the economic development of New Zealand 
led the government to prioritise the revision of its intervention in that sector.  If we add the 
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adverse budgetary conditions to this historic perspective, it is obvious that the farm sector 
could not have escaped economic reforms. 
 
In fact, it is necessary to note that “in the early 1980s the fiscal costs of assistance to 
agriculture rose very sharply as a result of a widening gap between market prices for some 
agricultural commodities and the prices guaranteed” by stabilisation programmes (Sheppard 
and Lattimore 1993).  This increase in subsidies to agriculture was so large and reached close 
to 40 per cent of the budget deficit in 1985. 
 
Equally, the increase in subsidies to the farm sector made them vulnerable to retaliation 
measures from importing countries.  This risk could not be taken lightly by the New Zealand 
farm sector because it was very dependent on external markets to sell its production. Nothing 
indicated that the situation would improve and as a consequence, drastically reducing 
agricultural subsidies was a means to rapidly improve the overall budget balance. 
 
In any case, did New Zealand have any other choice considering the increase in subsidies to 
the farm sector in all other industrialised countries?  According to Gibson et al. (1992), it 
became obvious that the government could not compete with the American, European and 
Japanese treasuries:  “Its treasury could not continue to cope in the mid-1980s” (Gibson et al. 
1992).  Gibson et al. (1992) argued that there was no other choice than to submit the agri food 
sector to the law of the market even though the market was distorted by agricultural subsidies 
in other countries and despite the risks that this put on the long-term competitiveness of the 
farm sector.  In this way they affirmed that “the meagre nature of a small country’s treasury 
forced it to bite the bullet and liberalise, regardless of the actions of other countries” (Gibson 
et al. 1992). 
 
Some political factors also caused the reforms to be put in place.  The Labour Party was 
brought to power in 1984 and did not depend on rural votes to gain its power:  “The Labour 
Party, given its urban base of support both ideologically and pragmatically, was also less 
likely to be interested in farmer concerns” (Roche et al. 1992). Walker and Bell emphasised 
that “farmers initially acted with disbelief.  They could not believe that government would not 
support them as it had done in the past.  Then they became very angry and, in 1986, nearly 
one-third of the farming population (sic) marched in protest to Parliament” (Walker and Bell 
1994).  The government did not change its policy. 
 
Cloke mentions that “the farming lobby in New Zealand was divided in its response to policy 
change…  The farmers’ interest group, Federated Farmers, was therefore subject to internal 
divisions over its response to policy change, and as a result its opposition was less effective 
than its previous history of influence and power might suggest” (Cloke 1989).  Sheppard and 
Lattimore (1993) have a point of view somewhat different than that of Cloke, but they arrive 
nevertheless at a similar conclusion: 
 
The New Zealand farmers union (Federated Farmers) strongly supported the 
overall liberalisation programme (including that for agriculture) but not the 
particular sequence and timing of policies chosen. However, once the 
particular sequence was chosen by Government it developed a momentum of 
its own which gave farmers little influence over the detail of the policy 
programme (Sheppard and Lattimore 1993). 
 
The traditionally powerful farmers’ union was not really consulted or listened to at the time of 
the implementation of the economic reforms.  It seemed evident that as well as the political 
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conditions there were economic conditions which favoured a fundamental calling into 
question of governmental intervention in the New Zealand farm sector. 
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Chapter 3 
The Dismantling of Agricultural Policies 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
As we have seen, the economic and budgetary crises which hit New Zealand at the beginning 
of the 1980s led to a total reform in government intervention in all economic activities.  But 
the farm sector was not affected by government political and economic reforms only for 
external reasons such as balance of payments, the budget deficit, etc.  The calling into 
question of agricultural policies and programmes was also justified by considerations more 
strictly agricultural. 
 
The level of subsidies was increasing, as we have already seen, but some production levels 
were also increasing, notably for sheep, even as the markets deteriorated. Also, as was 
mentioned in 1986 in a ministerial declaration signed by both the Minister of Agriculture and 
the Minister of Finance of the New Zealand government, “the farm sector was encouraged to 
believe that increased production would result in increased returns, ignoring the fact that farm 
incomes did not reflect overseas returns for farm products” (Moyle and Douglas 1985). 
 
Thus, all the support measures to the sector that was in place, and the apparent absence of 
response to the negative signals from the market, led the minister to say that the farm sector 
had evolved in a: 
 
…highly protected environment which insulated farmers from the changes 
taking place in the international markets. The government had effectively 
become the risk-taker in farming.  That form of support meant there was less 
incentive to look for greater efficiency in the farming sector. This put off 
necessary change in such areas as the processing sector which is now costing 
the farmer dearly (Moyle and Douglas 1986). 
 
Faced with such arguments that were put forward by ministers with joint responsibilities for 
the agricultural and finance portfolios, it is not surprising that support to the farm sector was 
questioned.  In fact, the wider economic reforms of politics and agricultural programmes were 
undertaken before this ministerial declaration. We will examine what the agricultural policy 
consisted of, explain the transition programmes which were considered necessary to help the 
farm sector adapt to the new economic environment and become more oriented to the 
markets, and analyse what remains of the agricultural programmes after ten years of economic 
reform. 
 
3.2 The cost of agricultural policy 
 
As in most of the developed countries, the agricultural policy of New Zealand was a vast 
panoply of programmes.  This panoply included input subsidies, some measures to support 
prices and incomes, technical support for the productive sector, programmes concerning the 
quality of agricultural products and some regulatory measures permitting the organisation of 
markets. Figure 3.1 shows the change in of the total expenditure of MAF.   
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Figure 3.1  MAF expenditure in millions of current dollars, New Zealand, 1960-1992  
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NB: From 1998, MAF contains also the forestry sector; missing data 1994 to 1996. 
Source: Appendix to the journals of the House of Representatives, Appendix B.7 Pt. 1, various years; 
http://www.treasury.govt.nz/notIndexed/expense02.xls and 04 
 
For all of the 1960s, MAF expenditure was less than $20 million.  In contrast, from the 
beginning of the 1970s, total expenditure increased rapidly to culminate in 1984 at close to 
$800 million and in 1987 at more than $1,700 million.  This increase in expenditure was 
wholly derived from an increase in transfer payments which from 1971 to 1985 oscillated 
between 50 per cent and 75 per cent of total expenditure.  In 1987, the transfer payments 
reached close to 90 per cent of the total MAF expenditure and the deficits accumulated by the 
Meat Industry Stabilisation Account and the Dairy Board working capital debt were written 
off by the government. 
 
However, it is since 1985 that the political reforms of agriculture began to have an effect.  
MAF expenditure has decreased since that year, with the exception of 1987.  Since 1990 total 
MAF expenditure has been maintained at under $200 million per year, a level around four 
times less than in 1984, the year preceding the beginning of the reform of agricultural policy. 
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Figure 3.2  Breakdown of MAF expenditure as percentage of the GDP, New Zealand, 1960-2001  
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Source: Appendix to the journals of the House of Representatives, Appendix B.7 Pt. 1, various years; 
http://www.treasury.govt.nz/notIndexed/expense02.xls and 04; missing data from 1994 to 1996. 
 
Another way of understanding the changes in the support to the agricultural sector is to 
examine measures that relate to the value of production; and these are shown in Figure 3.2.  
This graph shows the same patterns as the preceding analysis but it accentuates the effects of 
income support payments for the downturn years, which were 1976, 1979 and 1984. It should 
be noted that for all of the 1960s, MAF expenditure was maintained at around two per cent of 
the value of agricultural output.  In the 1970s, MAF expenditure as a percentage of 
agricultural output was variable, at 6.4 per cent on average for the decade.  After a relative 
pause in 1980 and 1981, the increase in MAF expenditure was almost exponential until 1984, 
when it reached nearly 13 per cent of gross agricultural output.  Finally, after a few years of 
reform, the level of MAF agricultural expenditure in the 1990s returned to that of the 
beginning of the 1960s, at less than two per cent of value of agricultural output. 
 
This simple observation puts the agricultural policy reform in perspective.  In effect, it seems 
that it was not the drastic decrease in subsidies from 1985 which was exceptional, rather it 
was the rapid increase in MAF expenditure between 1970 to 1984 that caused the increase in 
transfer payments9. These years corresponded with the period where the New Zealand 
government was engaged in a phase of public investment in order to improve the balance of 
payments.  In providing programmes of support for the level of agricultural income, the New 
Zealand government counted on increasing production and export receipts.  
 
3.3 Agricultural policy at the beginning of the reforms 
 
Historically, the research, advisory, and animal health and inspection services have been the 
base of agricultural policies in the developed countries.  New Zealand was no exception and 
as in other countries these programmes were universally provided by the government at no 
                                                 
 
9 An analysis of a longer period, since 1935, confirms that “with the exception of the immediate post World War 
II period, assistance to farming and export agriculture was negligible from the Depression until 197” (Lattimore 
1985). 
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cost to users. Given the relative stability of these programmes during these times, we have not 
considered it useful to analyse them in any more detail.  Of more interest are the programmes 
that were put in place to encourage the development of production in the 1970s and which 
were dismantled after 1985. 
 
These production development programmes involved direct transfer payments to the farm 
sector.  They were of three types: investment development, income support and stabilisation, 
and input subsidies. 
 
3.3.1 Programmes to develop investment 
 
In order to increase investment in the farm sector, the Livestock Incentive Scheme (LIS) and 
the Land Development and Encouragement Loans (LDEL) were introduced in 1976 and 1978 
respectively. These programmes were mainly concerned with the pastoral sector, the 
traditional export sector.  The LIS scheme which was in force from 1978 to 1982 was a direct 
intervention programme to increase the number of stock units10 retained for production.  A 
loan of $12 was given for each supplementary stock unit, or a tax deduction of $24 was 
available, in order to encourage permanent investment to increase the number of stock units 
retained for production.  If the increase in stock units was above two per cent and maintained 
for more than two years, the loan was simply written off.  Thus the loan was changed to a 
direct subsidy11. In total, around $145 million was given to the pastoral sector by this 
programme (Griffith and Martin 1988). 
 
The LDEL scheme was in force from 1978 to 1981 and had the objective of encouraging the 
development of unimproved land into permanent pasture.  Preferential loans were available 
for a term of 15 years for a maximum of $250 per hectare for all development projects of no 
less than 10 hectares carrying no less than 100 stock units.  If the increase was maintained to 
the satisfaction of the authorities, the interest accumulated was written off periodically and 
only half of the capital had to be repaid (Griffith and Martin 1988).  As a consequence, these 
concessions were a direct subsidy to the development of pastoral production.  In total, nearly 
$150 million of loans were granted (Johnson 1985). 
 
Other investment incentives were available.  For example, a depreciation rate much higher 
than normal was allowed for the first year for buying new equipment and machinery, and the 
construction of farm buildings and housing for employees.  Also, the possibility existed of 
deducting all development expenses, with the exception of machinery, from revenue in the 
year it was realised (Johnson 1986).  The calculations of Tyler and Lattimore show the value 
of all the fiscal measures for the pastoral sector was between $67 and $79 million per year 
from 1980 to 1983, and was more than $100 million in 1984 (Tyler and Lattimore 1990). 
 
Recall that at the end of 1970s, the policy to encourage investment was not directed only to 
the farm sector. The industrial sector benefited from large investment programmes, the ‘Think 
Big’ projects, in a similar way.  The main objective of New Zealand economic policy was, as 
we have already mentioned, to increase exports and to reduce imports in order to improve the 
balance of payments. 
                                                 
10  The stock unit is based on sheep and one beef animal equals six stock units. 
11 The minimum increase in stock units was different from year to year, but the basic principle of the programme 
stayed the same. 
 19
3.3.2 Income support and stabilisation programmes 
 
With a view to support productive investments in the farm sector, these programmes had the 
aim of providing income security to investors in farming.  The Boards had historically 
administered the income support and stabilisation programmes12.  The Dairy Board had a long 
history of experience administering stabilisation funds and worked on a self financing basis, 
from 1938 (Johnson 1986).  The Meat Board received governmental funds when required to 
support the price of production. Occasionally, the Wool Board intervened directly in the 
markets and acquired the volumes required to maintain the price, ultimately for reselling, thus 
playing a role in stabilising the markets.  Following the large fluctuations in market prices 
during the 1970s the principle of funds being theoretically self-financing was extended to the 
activities of the Meat Board and the Wool Board in 1975. 
 
These programmes financed themselves by deductions imposed on the total market income 
during years of good prices.  The reserves obtained in this way were to be used in years when 
price conditions deteriorated in order to provide a certain stabilisation of annual income.  
When the market price decreased under the trigger price, the Boards could either pay price 
supplements or buy the quantities required for the floor price to be reached.  If the 
stabilisation account was in deficit the Boards could obtain finance from the Reserve Bank at 
a preferential interest rate of one per cent (Sheppard and Biggs 1982). 
 
The stabilisation funds were not greatly used between 1976 and 1978, except in the dairy 
sector during only one production year.  Despite this, the Government decided to create a new 
stabilisation fund for pastoral agriculture, the Supplementary Minimum Price (SMP) scheme 
in 1978 (Sheppard and Biggs 1982). The SMP scheme was a subsidy programme entirely 
financed by public funds. If the market price was less than the programme target price, a 
direct income subsidy was paid by the government.  The SMPs were an official programme 
that replaced the ad hoc payments which had been used during the preceding market crises in 
1972/73 and 1975/76. 
 
The target price for SMPs was not fixed according to a precise basis and seemed to have 
varied from one year to another.  In 1978, at the time of its implementation, the target price 
had been established on the basis of an adequate income level for farmers (Sheppard and 
Biggs 1982). In contrast, the ministerial declaration of 1978 and 1979 announced a more 
market driven target price level for farmers.  Sheppard and Biggs (1982) concluded that “The 
emphasis had moved from the original idea of providing income adequacy for farmers and 
been replaced by a slightly more market orientation designed to protect the farmer from short 
term price recession”.  However, the target price for 1981/82 and 1982/83 had been fixed at a 
level above the market price, showing “a government return towards the income adequacy 
orientation of the SMP scheme”13 (Sheppard and Biggs 1982). 
 
Until 1981/82, no major government contribution to income support had been necessary 
(Johnson 1986)14. In contrast, from 1981/82, the situation changed drastically for the 
stabilisation funds as well as for SMPs.  
                                                 
12 For a history of the origins and activity of the different boards see Martin 1986. 
13 These authors emphasised that “It may not be inappropriate to suggest that the relatively high price levels 
announced… in the 1981 budget, may have been related to the political situation at that time in that 1981 was an 
election year” (Sheppard and Biggs 1982). 
14  Only the beef stabilisation funds had been used to pay stabilisation payments of $33 million in 1980 and 
1981. These payments came from deductions levied from a total of nearly $40 million obtained in 1978/79 when 
the market price was above the predetermined level. 
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A drop in price on the international markets combined with an increase in the SMP target 
price led to massive intervention in the sheepmeat market sector in 1981/82.  The inability of 
the market to reach the floor price of the Meat Board stabilisation programme had led the 
Meat Board to acquire the sheep production. The policy was pursued in two subsequent 
periods (1982/83 and 1983/84) when the Meat Board acquired the total production, and 
traditional exporters were then used by the Board as commission agents.  The Meat Board 
intervention was based on the SMP target price, and the difference between the target price 
and the intervention floor price in the stabilisation funds was covered by a direct government 
payment15.  The losses on these operations of selling the products on the markets were 
covered by the Board’s stabilisation funds, which led to a large operational deficit (Griffith 
and Martin 1988). 
 
SMP income subsidies were also paid in the beef sector in 1981/82 and 1982/83.  The market 
situation was relatively better than that for the sheep sector, and the intervention of the Meat 
Board and the use of stabilisation funds were only minor (Griffith and Martin 1988). 
 
Wool production had also benefited from SMP income support payments during 1981/82 and 
1983/84.  Moreover, the Wool Board stabilisation funds had been used to maintain incomes in 
1981/82 and 1982/83 (Griffith and Grundy 1988).  However, this intervention was financed 
by the reserves accumulated from 1976/77 to 1980/81. 
 
SMPs had little effect in the dairy sector with price supports only required in the year 1978/79 
(Griffith and Grundy 1988).  From 1979/80 to 1982/83, the Dairy Board stabilisation funds 
had accumulated a reserve of more than $150 million and only starting to use them a little in 
1983/84 (NZDB 1985).  In contrast, the Dairy Board working capital funds were financed by 
a loan of about $750 million from the Reserve Bank at a preferential interest rate of one per 
cent (Tyler and Lattimore 1990). 
 
Income support payments were also paid for adverse climatic conditions.  Notably, these ad 
hoc payments were made in 1978/79 following a drought which affected the East coast of the 
country (Johnson 1986).  It was an important period from the government’s point of view 
because the government had “to provide some compensation for the resulting loss of income 
and also to encourage farmers to continue development programmes” (Budget 1978, cited by 
Johnson 1986).  The logic was that if farm income needed to be stabilised and subsidised 
because of lowered market prices, it was also necessary to help in the case of climatic 
hazards. 
 
The production of fluid milk, eggs and wheat was oriented towards providing the internal 
market, and all these benefited from policies of fixing and supporting prices carried out by the 
boards.  Milk and eggs were under production quotas and fixed prices applied from farm level 
to consumer.  Wheat imports were controlled and the price fixed for both farms and milling.  
These three commodities evolved in a strongly regulated environment.  However, in value, 
these were relatively minor with respect to the total New Zealand agricultural production. 
 
                                                 
15 In this way, the SMP was used more as a way to sustain the market price of sheep production than a 
programme of income support which was originally the aim.  
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3.3.3 Programmes for input subsidies 
 
Input subsidy programmes had been used for a long time in the New Zealand farm sector.  
These programmes can be interpreted as compensation paid to the sector in the face of 
supplementary costs derived from the control of industrial imports.  In particular, transport 
and application of fertiliser had already been subsidised in the 1930s and this subsidy 
increased in the 1970s (Lattimore 1985). At the beginning of the 1980s the subsidies on 
fertilisers totalled more than $50 million annually (Tyler and Lattimore 1990). 
 
Capital inputs were also subsidised by means of a reduced interest rate from the Rural Bank, a 
government credit organisation.  These subsidies on interest can also be interpreted as 
investment and development support (see above). 
 
3.4 Agricultural policies in revision 
 
At the beginning of the reforms, the New Zealand agricultural policies can be seen as a set of 
measures, more or less coherent, to achieve the objective of increasing exports.  However, the 
effects of all these programmes on development of agricultural production has been discussed 
and not always agreed upon.  For Johnson, “the national goal of increased livestock exports 
was achieved”. He explained his comment by mentioning that “it does appear that the 
agricultural investment boom from 1978 to 1982 was sustained by satisfactory incomes in the 
1979-80 season and partly by policy measures introduced by Government at the time” 
(Johnson 1985). 
 
Regarding the specific effect of SMPs, Johnson adds that “the deficiency payments scheme 
did prevent sheep farmers’ incomes from declining over the years 1982-85, with a consequent 
maintenance of investment levels” (Johnson 1986).  In contrast, other authors affirmed that 
“the use of Supplementary Minimum Prices seems to be an inefficient way of achieving the 
desired objective of increases in agricultural production” (Sheppard and Biggs 1982).  
However, these authors note that the investment development programmes had the expected 
effect:  “it is clear that the LIS and LDEL programmes have contributed to the recent upsurge 
in production by assisting farmers to increase stocking capacity by upgrading low producing 
unimproved or reverted land” (Sheppard and Biggs 1982).  
 
It is not our purpose here to end with a debate on the respective effects of different 
programmes aimed at increasing agricultural exports.  What is of interest for us now is that 
the different authors agreed on the fundamental point that these programmes appear to have 
led to poor resource allocation in the agricultural sector in relation to the market returns.  As 
previously mentioned, a ministerial declaration indicated concerns about the gap between the 
level of agricultural income maintained by the subsidy programmes and the returns obtained 
from the export markets.  Johnson affirms that “in the period since 1981, New Zealand had 
probably produced higher levels of sheepmeat and wool output than were justified by world 
markets prices” (Johnson 1986). Sheppard and Lattimore agree with this statement and 
mention that of all the agricultural products “sheepmeat was the most significantly assisted…  
A result of this was excess supply of sheepmeat for export markets and lower market returns” 
(Sheppard and Lattimore 1993).  Tyler and Lattimore confirm this view when presenting the 
level of support to pastoral agriculture by type of production.  They show that sheep 
production increasingly benefited, reaching a maximum of 77 per cent of the total support in 
1984. 
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The reform of New Zealand agricultural policy, which we have covered in Chapter 2, must be 
seen more broadly than a distortion in favour of the sheep production sector created by these 
agricultural programmes.  Gibson et al. have noted that the “New Zealand policy reform in 
the mid-1980s was in part a realisation that the expense of maintaining farm prices for 
products with declining (or fluctuating) export prospects was becoming too great for macro-
economy stability” (Gibson et al. 1992).  It was from the end of 1984/85 that New Zealand 
agricultural policy, as we have described, began to be dismantled, and very quickly. 
 
With the change in course of the overall New Zealand government economic policy, the 
agricultural sector had to become more responsive to market signals to secure returns to its 
resources invested.  To achieve this, a large and rapid cut in most of the support programmes 
in place was undertaken as shown in Table 3.1.  Johnson described the new agricultural 
policy: 
 
In general, the new thrust of agricultural policy in New Zealand since 1984 has 
been to abolish input subsidies, phase out farm credit concessions, increase 
charges for government services, reduce distortions in taxation provisions, and 
to charge more realistic interest rates on marketing board trading and reserve 
stabilisation accounts. In line with this philosophy, the various marketing 
Boards have been required to modify their operations where these have been 
seen to contain high regulatory content (Johnson 1986). 
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Table 3.1  Change to agricultural programmes since 1984  
 When introduced
Year of 
change Change made From 
Programmes to develop 
investment     
     
Livestock Incentive schemes 
(LIS) 1976 1985 
Target 
considered met 1985 
Land Development 
Encouragement (LDES) 1978 1985 
Target 
considered met 1985 
Fiscal Measures  1986 Mostly abolished 1986 
     
Income Support and 
Stabilisation Programmes     
      
Stabilisation by the Wool 
Board 1976 1985 1985 
Stabilisation by the Meat 
Board 1976 1985 1985 
Stabilisation by the Dairy 
Board 1938 1985 
Increased 
interest on 
deficits 
1985 
     
Supplementary Minimum 
Prices (SMP) 1978 1984 Abolished 1984 
     
Wheat Board 1965 1983 Deregulation 1983 
Milk Board 1967 1986 Deregulation 1986 
Egg Board 1980 1986 Deregulation 1986 
     
Programmes for Input subsidies     
     
Fertiliser  1986 Abolished 1980 
Interest on Loans  1984 Market rate 1984 
Rural Bank  1987 Privatised 1987 
     
Services     
     
Research  1982 1982 
Advisory Services  1985 1985 
Inspection  1984 
Policy of 
recovering costs 1984 
     
Source: Adapted from Johnson 1986. 
 
3.4.1 The new macro-economic context 
 
The reform of public intervention in the New Zealand economy gave priority to the 
agricultural sector but not uniquely so.  A number of macro-economic measures were also 
rapidly put in place by the new government after its accession to power in 1984. 
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In July 1984, the New Zealand dollar was devalued 20 per cent, which favoured exporters and 
farmers in particular.  Then by March 1985, the exchange control was abolished and the 
dollar was floated.  Contrary to predictions, the dollar then increased in value (Sheppard and 
Lattimore 1993).  This was so significant that by October 1985 the dollar had regained two 
thirds of the value lost during the devaluation in 1984 (see Figure 3.3).  The revaluation 
severely affected farmer incomes, already decreased by the removal of many programmes and 
the fall of agricultural product prices on international markets. 
 
Figure 3.3  Trade weighted exchange rate index, New Zealand, January 1982 – December 2000  
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Source: Reserve Bank of New Zealand, Trade weighted exchange rate index, March 2005. 
 
This appreciation of the New Zealand dollar is explained in part by the liberalisation of 
financial markets and notably by the deregulation of interest rates in July 1984.  This 
liberalisation, combined with the government decision to borrow only from the New Zealand 
finance market, caused a net increase in interest rates (see Figure 3.4) which were previously 
kept at a low level (Sheppard and Lattimore 1993). 
 
The increase in interest rates, and the obligation given to the boards to finance their deficit at 
market rates, put an end to their stabilisation programmes.  Thus, with the simultaneous 
abolition of SMPs, the farmers found themselves with no income stabilisation programmes. 
They were also hit by progressive increases in Rural Bank loan rates to the current market 
level. 
 
During the same period, abolition of price and salary controls resulted in inflationary 
pressures.  The annual rate of increase of CPI reached nearly 16 per cent in 1985 (see Figure 
2.7 above), a level higher than New Zealand’s trading partners.  This inflation rate added to 
the problems encountered by farmers.  The value of agricultural products sold decreased 
because of the appreciation of the dollar, the decrease of prices on international markets and 
the end of subsidies.  At the same time, a high level of inflation in the rest of the economy 
contributed to a further increase in the cost of inputs and in the cost of living. 
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Figure 3.4  Interest rates on medium term government bonds, New Zealand, 1975-2004  
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NB: * Government Securities Yields. From 1975 to 1977, 3 to 10 years; from 1978 to 1985, 2 to 5 years; since 1986, 5 
years. 
Source: Reserve Bank New Zealand Bulletin, various years; PCInfos: 6.05, FINA.SKF - Key Market rates, 
Government Stock Yields, 5 years (from 1986); and our calculations. 
 
In total, the whole macro-economic situation which prevailed in 1985/86 can be summarised 
as follows: 
 
The high value of the dollar reduced farm product prices and their effect was 
compounded by weak international markets. Taking these factors together 
farmers were hit by lower prices for their products, together with high costs of 
servicing debt, over a period in which the Government’s measures to reduce 
inflation were seen to have been taking a long time to act.  The net result is that 
farm incomes were reduced to their lowest level in real terms for many years 
(Sheppard and Lattimore 1993). 
 
Johnson (1986), who noted a similar effect on farm income from the macro-economic policies 
and from the significant impact of dismantling the agricultural policies, mentioned that: 
 
There is clearly a need to focus on the changed income position of export 
producers in general and that of sheep-farmers in particular.  Adjustments will 
be needed in the land market, the agricultural finance market and in farm 
ownership.  Transition arrangements are needed to change to the total market 
environment that has been introduced by the government (Johnson 1986). 
 
We believe that the government authorities had arrived at the same conclusion because the 
transition programmes became effective at the end of 1986/87. 
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3.4.2 The transition programmes 
 
The New Zealand government put in place a number of transition programmes in order to 
facilitate the agricultural sector to move to a new economic environment orientated to the 
market.  Essentially, these transition programmes had the objective of lightening the burden 
of farmer's debt, at the level of their collective organisation as well as at the individual level. 
 
At the collective level, the Dairy Board had purchased for $150 million nearly $750 million of 
the debt it had with the Reserve Bank.  Similarly, the debt of the Meat Board stabilisation 
funds had also in large part been written off by government contributions of $930 million 
(Tyler and Lattimore 1990).  With financial viability re-established, the boards could continue 
to play a role in organising the markets, especially the Dairy Board, which had become the 
export firm for New Zealand dairy products. 
 
At the individual level, the Minister of Finance and Agriculture announced the establishment 
of special programmes relating to farmers’ debt in 1986.  The “Rural Bank Discount Scheme” 
had a double objective: “It will encourage farmers to get on with debt restructuring and, at the 
same time, help place the Rural Bank portfolio on a more commercial basis” (Moyle and 
Douglas 1986).  This policy made the Rural Bank financially more attractive for eventual 
investors and prepared it for subsequent privatisation. This programme was available to 
producers who were not in a position to meet their financial obligations.  A part of their debt 
was written off by the Rural Bank but in response the interest rate on the loan was 
immediately raised to current market rates.  A deal also had to be made with other creditors 
which involved restructuring the farmer’s debt.  Finally, budgets had to be produced16 which 
demonstrated that, following the restructuring of debt, the farm returned to viability (Moyle 
and Douglas 1986). 
 
This programme was complemented by the “Conditional Seasonal Finance Guarantee 
Scheme” for farmers for whom the Rural Bank was not the principal creditor.   In this case, 
the Rural Bank agreed to finance up to 50 per cent of the amount required to assure the 
operating expenses of the farm. The same conditions as above applied, as well as the 
assurance that other creditors accepted the debt arrangements of the farmer. 
 
There were 8,100 farms involved in the Rural Bank Discount Scheme, around 10 per cent of 
the total of New Zealand farms (Johnson 1989).  The requests from 4,700 farmers had been 
accepted by the Rural Bank while 700 other farmers restructured their debt by other means.  
Among the 2,700 farmers who were declined, some were judged to be in a “too good” 
financial situation to be eligible for the programme and others could not demonstrate their 
future viability (Johnson and Sandrey 1990).  In total, $228 million of debt was written off, 
with an average of $50,000 per farmer representing 33 per cent of the initial level of 
indebtedness of these farmers (Johnson 1989a).  
 
The ministerial declaration in 1986 also provided better access for social payments to farm 
families.  Notably, there was financial assistance to look for work provided by the Social 
Welfare Department which was also authorised to pay special payments covering the 
minimum cost of living of families (Moyle and Douglas 1986). 
 
                                                 
16 It was explicitly mentioned in the Ministerial Directive that these budgets could not anticipate an increase in 
farm prices and had to be based on the performance of the existing management. 
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Another transition programme, the “New Start Grant”, had been put in place in 1988 to 
encourage those whose farm was no longer viable to leave agriculture. In fact, this 
programme had been created following a severe drought which had affected mainly the East 
Coast of both the South and the North Islands.  It is not necessary to discuss here whether this 
was more of an insurance programme or a transition programme.  Whatever the case, drought 
added to the financial problems already experienced by many farmers as a result of the 
process of change in agricultural policies (Sheppard and Lattimore 1993).  In the context of 
this programme, the farmers were offered a free evaluation of their financial situation.  Those 
who had irremediably jeopardised finances could receive a subsidy of $45,000 to leave their 
farm with all their personal possessions and a car.  In the region most affected by the drought, 
seven per cent of farmers took advantage of the programme (Taylor 1990).  It must be noted, 
however, that 20 per cent of these farmers stayed on their farm but in a new form of 
ownership (Fairweather 1992).  In total for all of New Zealand, around 350 families left 
farming (Morris 1991). 
 
These transition programmes put in place by the government led to a smaller decrease17 in the 
number of farmers than first expected. Referring to the total economic situation, the change in 
agricultural policies and the base price of agricultural products, Gibson et al. confirm that: 
 
In such a situation it might be expected that there would be a massive exit from 
farming. Even official thinking seemed to accept this view, with Prime 
Minister Lange suggesting that 5,000 farmers (approximately seven per cent of 
the total) would have to leave the land…  The fragments of evidence suggest a 
much less costly adjustment…  Adjustment costs were lower ex post than 
expected ex ante.  This was partly due to debt restructuring initiated by the 
government-owned Rural Bank (Gibson et al. 1992). 
 
3.5 Agricultural policies in the 1990s 
 
The revision of the agricultural policies in 1984 led to a real dismantling of the majority of 
programmes (see Table 3.1).  The investment development programmes, income stabilisation 
and support measures, and input subsidies had initially been abolished.  As for research, 
advisory, and animal health and inspection, these were relatively little affected by the reform 
of agricultural policies.  However, they were subject to a policy of recovering costs at the end 
of 1990 because of the reform of national accounting.  In particular, advisory and inspection 
have been financially supported in part by the users of these services.  In fact, up to 1992 only 
the research sector could count on relatively constant level of subsidies. 
 
In relation to income support, there remained only occasional programmes for natural 
catastrophes.  The New Zealand government had sought to better define the limits of this 
intervention since 1986 in order to determine the precise scale of compensation in this 
domain, rather than using ad hoc interventions as in the past.  Morris mentioned that: 
 
During the early 1980s adverse events continued to be considered on an ad hoc 
basis.  Successive events received greater and greater levels of assistance.  In 
addition, inadequate specification of criteria which defined whether an adverse 
event should or should not be declared resulted in a situation where large parts 
of New Zealand were continually under adverse event declaration for drought 
(Morris 1991). 
                                                 
17 The structural issue is discussed in the next chapter.  
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However, the exercise did not seem to have been very conclusive.  In effect, the criteria of a 
natural catastrophe in the case of drought, excessive rain and flooding had been elaborated.  In 
these cases, the official means of intervention was a refund of interest for the two first years 
of the duration of the loans considered necessary to face the damage caused by the climatic 
event.  
 
Having said this, it is not correct to conclude that the natural catastrophes were an occasion 
for the government to reinstate a high level of support to the farm sector.  The total level of 
support to the sector had been drastically cut and the compensation given in the case of 
natural catastrophe was for significant damages truly suffered by farmers.  Current policy 
emphasises that farmers are responsible for the costs of natural disasters and recent experience 
indicates that the government will provide co-ordination and some minor assistance to 
farmers, but not direct payments. 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
 
Examination of current agricultural policies should not lead us to conclude that the New 
Zealand farm sector has been entirely deregulated.  It is more correct to note that the subsidies 
to the sector have been drastically reduced.  As to the deregulation, it was mainly applied to 
the marketing boards which were oriented towards supplying the internal market, namely the 
New Zealand Poultry Board in the egg sector, the New Zealand Milk Board in the fluid milk 
sector and the New Zealand Wheat Board in the milling industry.   
 
In contrast, the marketing Boards concerned with exports have been maintained.  In fact, the 
Kiwifruit Board was created in 1988, in the thick of the deregulation of the whole economy.  
This Board had the control of all exports and it was the major exporter of New Zealand 
kiwifruit on the international markets.  The Board was privatised in 2000 and is now called 
Zespri Group International. The kiwi farmers are the shareholders18. Zespri International 
remains the single New Zealand kiwifruit exporter on the world market, except for exports to 
the Australian market.  
 
In regard to the milk industry, the New Zealand Dairy Board had the main role as single 
exporter of dairy products on the international market. It had managed to survive the 
deregulation wave of the New Zealand economy.  New Zealand farmers had kept the power to 
organize themselves collectively to maximize the exports incomes, but this power had always 
been discussed. (Zwart and Moore 1990). 
 
But with the beginning of a new cycle of WTO negotiation, the structure of the dairy industry 
did not seem matched with New Zealand’s long view interests.  Indeed, the Dairy Board was 
considered to be a state business company because it was based on a restrictive legislative 
frame that ensured a daily export monopoly on dairy products. This weakened the New 
Zealand position in the trade negotiations because New Zealand advocates total openness on 
the agricultural markets without governmental support.  After several years of discussion, the 
New Zealand dairy industry chose a new strategy in 2000: the creation of a single big 
company controlling the collection, transformation and exportation of milk in order to furnish 
a strong financial base allowing it to keep investments abroad (MAF, 2001).  A proposal was 
put forward for a fusion between the two bigger companies of dairy transformation: the New 
Zealand Dairy Group of Companies (NZDG) and the Kiwi Co-operative Dairies Ltd (Kiwi). 
However, the idea was not shared by everybody and they did not succeed in establishing a 
                                                 
18 See http://www.fruitgrowers.org.nz/industry/ 
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merger agreement. The consequence was several small unions and acquisitions in the 
industry. Kiwi bought Tasman Milk Products Ltd and Kaikoura Co-op Dairy Co Ltd in 
September 2000 and merged with the Marlborough Cheese Co-op Dairy Co Ltd in November 
of the same year. About the end of 2000, four independent companies of dairy product 
transformation remained in New Zealand.  
 
Finally, on 21 December 2000, Kiwi and NZDG announced they had merged their production 
in a new company which would also integrate the businesses of the Dairy Board. The new 
entity became Fonterra Co-operative Group Ltd. The official merger happened in September 
2001 in the Dairy Industry Restructuring Act frame. After the merger, Fonterra was obliged to 
buy the shares of the two other transformation companies, which belonged to the Dairy 
Board. The Dairy Industry Act decided that these two companies, Tatua and Westland, could 
remain independent cooperatives. But the Fonterra shareholders represent 95 per cent of the 
New Zealand dairy farmers (Fonterra, 2004), which leaves little room for the other 
companies. 
 
In order to control Fonterra’s significant market power during the first years of activities, the 
government introduced a set of measures favouring the competition in the industry sector. 
Thus Fonterra must observe some rules such as the free entry.  The farmers who are Fonterra 
members can also sell up to 20 per cent of their milk to other factories.  Moreover, the New 
Zealand government obliges Fonterra to provide raw milk to independent factories at 
competitive prices (MAF). 
 
In order to keep a level of competition on the national market, the government decided the 
merger was contingent on the disinvestment of 50 per cent of the Fonterra shares in New 
Zealand Dairy Foods, owned by NZDG before the merger.  The activities of this company are 
focused on the local New Zealand fresh and transformed dairy product market. 
 
It must be noted that the New Zealand government worked efficiently with the industry to 
facilitate this merger and to regulate it.  Actually, the objective is reached because even if 
Fonterra has no more legislative power than the Dairy Board, it keeps the trade power de 
facto and remains the single, almost exclusive exporter of New Zealand dairy products on the 
international market.  The situation would have been different if the Dairy Board had been 
abolished from 1984 when the dairy transformation industry in New Zealand still constituted 
of more than 30 companies (Cocombe et al., 1991). The New Zealand government waited 
until the reorganisation of the dairy transformation industry was such that the abolition of the 
Dairy Board had a neutral effect on the exporting organisations. In this sense, the market 
power of Fonterra is not less than that of the Dairy Board, but it is no longer a state company.  
For this reason, New Zealand has a stronger position in WTO negotiations. Today, Fonterra is 
the biggest dairy product exporter in the world and has a membership of 13,000 New Zealand 
dairy farmers.  Fonterra counts for 20 percent of the total export values of New Zealand and 
produces 7 percent of its GDP (Fonterra 2004). 
 
Having said this, there is no doubt that farm incomes are now dependent on the remuneration 
obtained from the market and, for a large part, on the international market.  Direct transfers to 
the farm sector from public funds are almost non-existent, and saved only for the case of 
natural catastrophes.  However, this occasional aid is much lower than the record levels 
attained in the 1980s. 
 
It is necessary to note from the above analysis of the change in state intervention in the farm 
sector in New Zealand, that the massive aid, in particular the transfer payments, only 
represented a relatively short period in the history of agricultural development of the country.  
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Income support had been increasing from the end of the 1970s and raised to exceptional 
levels for four years (1983 to 1985 and 1987) when the expenditure of the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Fisheries (MAF) surpassed $400 million (see Figure 3.1).  Thus, it was not so 
much the abolition of subsidies to the farm sector from 1985 that was exceptional but the 
relatively short period of high levels of support.  From this point of view, the specificity of the 
farm sector justifying particular intervention from the state seems questioned by the 
experience of New Zealand, not only by the revision of agricultural policies since 1985, but 
by the longer history of relatively low levels of government support. 
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Chapter 4 
Structural Changes 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
If any sector was subjected to rapid policy reforms at the same time as a market crisis for its 
products, we would expect it to experience rapid structural changes.  The specificity of the 
farm sector, however, would be expected to lead to a certain delay in structural adjustment.  
Many authors have already emphasised the ability of family farmers to stay in business with 
weak price levels and lowered profitability of production.  Thus, in the developed countries, 
the maintenance of the number of farm families in conditions of low remuneration from their 
own resources is already proven.  This situation is explained by the status of family 
organisation in agriculture, as emphasised by Morisset and Réveret: 
 
In almost all farming, … the predominant form of production consist of farms 
of a pre-capitalist type, that are not completely integrated into the market.  
There does not exist a separation between capital and labour.  And these two 
“factors of production” do not always require the market level of remuneration 
(Morisset and Réveret 1985). 
 
Servolin argues in the same way when he talks of small-scale production in French 
agriculture: “The goal of production is not to put a value on capital and obtaining a profit, but 
the subsistence of the farmer and his family, and the reproduction of the means of production 
necessary to assure this” (Servolin 1972). 
 
Thus, in terms of the process of structural adjustment in this context, the decrease in the 
profitability of agricultural production can have only small structural effects in the short term.  
Family farm organisation, largely dominant in New Zealand (Fairweather 1992), has been 
able to resist the effects of lowered incomes in the short term by reducing its standard of 
living19.  The family assets (labour and capital) do not necessarily need to be remunerated at 
the market rate.  Moreover, in the short term, farmers could respond to decreasing income by 
increasing their labour effort and increasing production.  But in the case of a severe decrease 
in profitability for a long period, the capacity to keep in business can rapidly reach its limits.  
This is more true for heavily indebted farmers who are obliged to find a return at market rates 
for a large part of the capital engaged in production.  And even for the others, the pressure for 
returns from their own resources, and the limit to the decline in their standard of living, can 
show up as structural change in the medium term as our analysis can show. 
 
The remainder of this chapter will describe each of the elements in the structural change of 
agricultural policies in New Zealand. 
                                                 
 
19 The issue of the change in the level of farm and family income is analysed in the next chapter. 
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4.2 Concentration in the production sector 
4.2.1 The number of farms 
 
Following the revision of New Zealand agricultural policy and the abolition of transfer 
payments to the farm sector, which we have outlined in the preceding chapter, the drop in the 
number of farms was less than previously expected by the government.  On the contrary, the 
number of farms rose until 1989 (see Figure 4.1), which is quite exceptional for a developed 
country.  However, this increase in farms had already begun before the revision of agricultural 
policy in 1985.  In 1989, a delay of four years, there was a reversal of the trend and the 
number of farms began to fall. 
 
Figure 4.1  Number of farms, New Zealand, 1970-2003  
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NB: from 1994, pieces of data can not be compared with the previous years and between them because 
of methodological changes 
Source : MAF (2004). 
 
This delay could be considered normal, especially since we have already mentioned the 
resistance capacity of farm families in conditions of economic difficulty.  
 
However, the major increase in the total number of farms between 1986 and 1988 was the 
result of the increase in the number of small farms (Fairweather, 1992).  Thereafter, the 
decrease in the total number of farms seems radical.  However, successive changes in data 
gathering from 1994 make comparison of the data of the change in the farm number 
impossible between the different years. Moreover, the survey that identified the number of 
farms in New Zealand was not completed in 1997, 1998, 2000 and 2001. 
 
The delay in family farm adjustment to changes in economic conditions is reflected in 
changes of type of production (see Figure 4.2).  The case of sheep production is particularly 
interesting since, as the preceding chapter shows, this sector was most supported and 
therefore the most affected by the removal of agricultural subsidies.  Thus, the number of 
sheep farms had been increasing in the 1970s reaching its peak in 1982.  Following this, the 
decline which began before 1985 continued until 1989 at an annual rate of 1.1 per cent to 3.5 
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per cent.  It then accelerated to 10.7 per cent, 6.6 per cent and 8.4 per cent respectively in 
1990, 1991 and 1992.  This sector was already in decline before the revision of agricultural 
policy, but the decline increased considerably five years after the reforms. 
 
Given the increase in the total number of farms, at least to 1989, the decrease in the number of 
sheep farms was compensated for by an increase in other types, especially beef. The 
combination of resources required for sheep and beef production is similar and these two 
types of production are easily interchanged.  The number of beef farms, which were relatively 
stable since 1978, followed a reverse pattern compared to the number of sheep farms since 
1982.  The number of beef farms therefore increased considerably by 76 per cent between 
1982 and 1992. 
 
The number of dairy farms, which declined throughout the 1970s, also began to increase in 
1982.  However, the total increase from 1982 to 1992 was only seven per cent and varied 
from one year to another.  As for sheep and beef production, dairy production is based on the 
use of pasture and competes with these other sectors for the use of land.  Nevertheless, some 
more important investments are necessary for dairy production, notably the cost of milking 
equipment.  Thus the increase in the number of beef farms and dairy farms confirms that the 
high levels of subsidies benefited the sheep sector relatively more.  The number of sheep 
farms is now decreasing and part of the resources engaged in sheep production seem to have 
been moved towards the other sectors of pastoral agriculture. 
 
The category of other types of farms is a quite disparate group including horticulture and 
“other” animals such as deer, goats, horses and pigs.  The number of farms in this category 
has been increasing dramatically since the beginning of the 1970s until 1979 when there only 
was a modest increase until 1982. Subsequently, the increase persisted with some acceleration 
until 1988 and then levelled off.  However, as for the total number of farms, their number 
began to decline in 1990. 
 
For these other farms many phenomena seem relevant in explaining their increase until 1989.  
First, there has been subdivision of larger farms and new land has primarily been used for 
horticulture.  One of the major horticultural activities was the production of kiwifruit20 on 
small units of intensive land use.  Second, the important increase in new animal production, in 
particular deer and goats (see below), has contributed to an increase in the number of farms in 
this category.  Finally, the increase of the number of lifestyle blocks is notable in this category 
of farms.  The number of small farms increased from 8,074 to 11,168, or from 29.7 per cent to 
36.5 per cent of the total in this category, between 1986 and 1990 (Fairweather, 1992). 
                                                 
20 It is necessary to note however that the total area in kiwifruit production levelled at around 18,000 hectares in 
1985, but that there were only 720 hectares in 1972. 
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Figure 4.2  Number of farms by type of production, New Zealand, 1970-1992 
 
Source: Department of Statistics, Agricultural Statistics; and our calculations. 
 
The recent decrease in the number of “other” farms appears to have resulted more from the 
conditions of the market than from the process of revision of agricultural policy.  For 
example, kiwifruit production was going through an important market crisis because the 
arrival of new producing countries had created instability in the export markets.  Similarly, 
Angora goats were rapidly decreasing in numbers as we will see later, because the expected 
market opportunities were not realised.  Finally, the stock market “crash” of 1987 reduced the 
demand for lifestyle blocks (Fairweather 1992). 
 
In total, it seems that the decrease in the number of sheep farms since 1982 has been 
associated with an increase in the number of farms in other traditional pastoral sectors.  
Equally, there has been some diversification towards non-traditional sectors (goats, deer and 
horticulture), which began in the 1970s and has continued.  Following the revision of 
agricultural policies, there do not seem to have been marked changes from the tendencies 
already occurring.  Only the decrease in the number of sheep farms has accelerated, after a lag 
of four years. 
 
The overall change in the number of farms is, however, only one facet of the process of 
structural change.  The utilisation of agricultural land is another which we will consider now. 
 
4.2.2 The utilisation of agricultural land 
 
In general in developed countries, the process of concentration of production operates by 
decreasing the number of farms on a relatively fixed area of land.  This occurs as population 
increases and other pressures like urbanisation, industrial and recreation uses take land out of 
production. New Zealand has been in a peculiar position of agricultural land usage.  In 
regards to the total agricultural land area, there was an increase of eight per cent between 
1972 to 1983 followed by a slight decrease of three per cent between 1983 and 1991.  During 
this time, the number of farms had been increasing quite rapidly as we have seen previously, 
and consequently the average area of farms declined (see Figure 4.3).  From this perspective, 
there has therefore not been a concentration of the land resource.  The methodological 
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changes in the data gathering limit the possibility of analysis of changes in the agricultural 
area after 1991. 
 
Figure 4.3  Total agricultural area* and average size of farm**, New Zealand, 1972-2003  
 
Notes:  * It deals with the sum of the areas in pasture, cereal, horticulture and tree planting. 
 ** From 1994, pieces of data cannot be compared with the previous years and between them because of 
 methodological changes 
Source: MAF 1993, p. 110; MAF 2004 and our calculations. 
 
In total, despite the decline in the area of pasture since 1982, pastoral production remains by 
far the main user of the land resource in New Zealand, with more than 85 per cent of the total 
agricultural area. But during the period between 1972 and 2003, tree plantations increased the 
most by more than three times21. Having said this, pastoral production remains the main user 
of the land resource in New Zealand. Therefore, the change in the different livestock “carried” 
by this land resource should be also analysed.  
 
Figure 4.4 shows that the total number of stock units had increased until 1980, but it was 
stable from 1980 to 1986 and then began to decrease.  This decline occurred because the 
decrease in the number of sheep was not compensated for by the increase in other pastoral 
activities. This decrease plateaued in 1993 and the total number of stock units has remained 
more or less stable from this period. As for the number of sheep, they increased from 1975 to 
1982, probably supported by, among others things, the development programmes for 
agriculture then in force.  They began to decrease rapidly in 1986, and continued falling until 
2001. 
 
                                                 
21 The tree plantations passed from an area of 519,000 ha in 1972 to 1,840,000 ha in 2003 (MAF, 2004, p.120) 
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Figure 4.4  Number of stock units and number of sheep, New Zealand, 1970-2004  
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Source: Department of Statistics, Agricultural Statistics, cat. 14.101 and 01.018.0091 Annual Review of the 
New Zealand Sheep and Beef Industry. 
 
The change in beef cattle numbers (see Figure 4.5) is the reverse of the changes in number of 
sheep.  They steadily decreased from 1975 to 1983 and then increased until 1995. After a fall 
until 1998, beef livestock numbers then stabilised.  This confirms that these two types of 
production are substitutable in the short-term.  However, in the medium and long-term it was 
dairy production which was the main pastoral production.  Dairy had been decreasing for all 
of the 1970s, and have increased regularly since then.  Only a brief pause in 1986 and 1987 
broke this increase, these two years being characterised by low dairy product prices on 
international markets.  By contrast, between 1999 and 2002, the dairy cattle increase was 
particularly rapid. 
 
Finally, deer and goat numbers increased significantly from the beginning of the 1980s (see 
Figure 4.6).  The increase in deer has been maintained for all of the period of observation, 
only slowing down between 1992 and 1996.  In contrast, the number of goats after having 
shown one of the most rapid increases, decreased just as rapidly to finally plateau in 1996.  
The profitability of this production did not meet initial expectations and this could explain the 
decrease in numbers. 
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Figure 4.5  Number of beef cattle and dairy cattle, New Zealand, 1970-2004  
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Source: Department of Statistics, Agricultural Statistics, cat. 14.101 and 01.018.0091 and Annual Review of the New 
Zealand Sheep and Beef Industry. 
 
 
Figure 4.6  Number of deer and goats, New Zealand, 1979-2004  
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Source: Department of Statistics, Agricultural Statistics, cat. 14.101 and 01.018.0091 and Annual Review 
of the New Zealand Sheep and Beef Industry. 
 
The essential element which derives from this analysis is that overall the number of stock 
units carried on the agricultural area began to decrease in a significant way in 1987.  It is 
likely that this results from the abolition of subsidies to the pastoral sector and, in particular, 
the sheep sector.  But once again, the effects of the revision to agricultural policy do not seem 
to have led to major changes in the tendencies already at work: trends in beef and dairy cow 
numbers were relatively unaffected by the policy changes and trends in sheep number were 
accelerated. 
 
In total, the overall data do not seem to show that political and economic decisions affected 
the level of concentration in the farm sector.  In fact, structural changes are the result of many 
factors.  Of course, the abolition of subsidies can have an effect but one which is only a part 
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of the more global question of the relative returns to different types of production.  Another 
factor is the increase in lifestyle blocks, allowing initially non-farming people to experience 
rural living, and this is not directly related to the intrinsic profitability of the farm sector.  
Based on the analysis of the aggregated data for New Zealand, there has not been a 
concentration of land in farming, but there may have been concentration of production in 
some sub-sectors of production.  An analysis of land areas and of the number of farms by size 
is necessary to address the complexity of all the factors at work. 
 
4.2.3 An analysis of the farming area and of livestock by size of farm 
 
Figure 4.7 shows that the increase in the total number of farms for most of the period of 
observation mainly came from the increase in small farms, those with less than 40 hectares.  
Once again, the double phenomenon of increasing numbers of horticultural farms and lifestyle 
blocks seem to be significant causes.  In contrast, for the other size farm groups, the changes 
are minimal and the variations from one year to another are only marginal. 
 
Figure 4.7  Number of farms by size of farm, New Zealand, 1972-1992  
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Source: Department of Statistics, Agricultural Statistics and Agricultural Production Survey for the year 
ended 30 June 2002; Fairweather 1992; MAF, special results; and our calculations.  
 
Finally, we can conclude that the drop in the total number of farms since 1990 does not seem 
to be linked to size because all of the farm size groups have decreased in number of farms.  
Thus, any concentration that is occurring is slight and is not a characteristic of any particular 
farm size.  It is more a feature of the general process of adjustment to all categories of size. 
 
In order to observe contradictory concentration phenomena (increase then decrease of the 
number of large farms) which happened both before and after 1988, it is useful to look in 
detail at structural changes in the sheep and dairy sectors, these being the two most important 
pastoral land uses.  In the sheep sector, we note an increase in the small farms (less than 500 
sheep) until 1990 (see Figure 4.8).  The small farms accounted in 1992 for nearly 50 per cent 
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of all sheep farms, compared to only 30 per cent in 1970.  Some authors argue that the 
lifestyle blocks are one of the causes:  “Also of significance was a growth in small sheep and 
beef farms (especially during the late 1970s) as lifestyle blocks” (Sheppard and Lattimore 
1993).  In contrast, from 1992 the number of small sheep farms began decreasing, but their 
proportion in the total of farms remained fairly constant, changing from 49 per cent to 46 per 
cent of the sheep farm total. 
 
Figure 4.8  Number of sheep farms by size of flock, New Zealand, 1970-2002  
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Source: Department of Statistics, Agricultural Statistics; Fairweather 1992; MAF, special results; and our 
calculations. 
 
In contrast, the number of mid-sized farms (500 to 1,999 sheep) has been in constant decline, 
changing from 43 per cent to 22 per cent of the total number of sheep farms.  For the large 
farms, those with flocks of between 2000 and 5000 sheep, the change in their number has 
followed that of livestock: an increase in 1978 and 1985, then a decrease following the 
abolition of support to that sector. It seems then that these are the farms most affected by the 
reforms in agricultural policy.  The very large farms, with more than 5000 heads showed no 
increase in number after the reform of the agricultural policy, then increased again to reach a 
new peak in 1999.  After this time, their number reached a plateau.  
 
Figure 4.9 confirms that the fall in sheep numbers observed since 1985 came mainly from 
farms with large flocks of over 2000 sheep.  While the number of animals on farms with 
between 2000 and 5000 sheep continued decreasing, farms with large flocks of over 5000 
sheep reached a plateau and even increased slightly in 2002.  The farms with small flocks 
seem little affected by economic conditions since the stock number has remained constant 
since 1985 and changed little over the whole period up to 2002.22.  
 
                                                 
22 We have to note that the number of sheep farms with less than 500 sheep increased significantly from 1970 to 
1992 although this category of size has a constant number of sheep.  It probably means that more smallholdings 
could be lifestyle blocks with fewer sheep. 
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Figure 4.9  Number of sheep by size of flock, New Zealand, 1970-2002  
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Source: Department of Statistics, Agricultural Statistics; MAF, special results; and our calculations. 
 
The dairy sector has increased in importance since the beginning of the 1980s with overall 
gains in number between 1981 and 1992.  Unlike the sheep farms, dairy farms with large 
herds of more than 300 cows have been steadily increasing (see Figure 4.10).  In this sector 
too, the total number of dairy cattle in medium-sized herds (100 to 199 cows) has been 
declining.  For dairying, small production units do not seem possible.  The milking equipment 
that has to be purchased is clearly more expensive than the capital expenses in the sheep 
sector, and it is likely that the dairy herds on lifestyle blocks are very small in number.  In this 
sector, the tendencies at work seem to have been constant since 1975.  The changes in the 
agricultural policies after 1985 do not seem to have had major structural effects, unlike in the 
sheep sector. 
 
In conclusion, we can note that the growth until 1990 in the number of farms in New Zealand 
largely came from the contribution of “small” farms.  The phenomenon of lifestyle blocks 
seems to be the primary reason.  The revision of agricultural policies since 1985 does not 
seem to have led to the process of concentration in the farm sector.  Conversely, since 1985 
the number of large sheep farms which was increasing earlier has been decreasing.  Farms 
with more than 5,000 sheep owned 37 per cent of the livestock in 2002 compared to 31.9 per 
cent in 1985. The phenomenon only reversed itself from 1999. This sector is relatively 
concentrated since these large farms accounted for only 5.4 per cent of the total of sheep 
farms in 2002.  Small farms on the other hand, the farms with less than 500 sheep, are high in 
numbers.  Forty two per cent of the sheep farms in 2002 were small in size, but owned only 
3.5 per cent of the livestock.   
 
The dairy cattle numbers are generally increasing.  In terms of concentration, the dairy cattle 
owned by the farms with large herds, more than 300 cows, have multiplied by four since 
1985.  This is a long term tendency with an increase since 1999. 
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Figure 4.10  Number of dairy cattle by size of herd, New Zealand, 1970-2002  
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Source: Department of Statistics, Agricultural Statistics; MAF, special results; and our calculations. 
 
4.3 Change in the levels of production and agricultural exports 
 
We have seen that during the period preceding the revision of agricultural policy in New 
Zealand, a certain number of programmes were put in place to encourage production.  The 
objective was to improve the balance of payments by increasing agricultural exports.  In 
consequence, we can examine if the removal of different programmes and the changes that we 
have analysed caused a fall in agricultural production and exports. 
 
4.3.1 The increase in production  
 
An overall measure of agricultural production is represented by the value of agricultural 
production shown in Figure 4.11.  In current dollars, the tendency for the increase in the value 
of production was broken by a fall in 1986 and 1987 compared to the level attained in 1985.  
In constant dollars, the value of production was above the level attained during the 1960s for 
all of the 1970s and until 1985. It declined drastically in 1986 and 1987 and returned 
approximately to the same level as in the 1960s.  A decrease of this magnitude (-27 per cent 
between 1985 and 1987) had already been observed in 1975 (-32 per cent), but with the 
difference that since 1985 the drop occurred for a much longer period. It was only from 1993 
that a new significant increase of the value in the New Zealand farm production happened and 
again from 1998, with a bigger increase. 
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Figure 4.11  Agricultural output in current and constant (June 1999 = 1000) dollars, New 
Zealand, 1961-2002  
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Source: New Zealand Official Yearbook, various years; MAF 1994; and our calculations. 
 
However, this total measure of the value of agricultural production combines production 
volumes and income obtained from the market.  A rise or fall in value of production can be 
due to variation in the market price and not reflect change in the volume of production.  
Figure 4.12 shows the change in the volume of agricultural production. 
 
From the end of 1976 and again in 1978, we can see a decrease in beef production and an 
increase in sheep meat production.  In 1984, the production of beef attained a low which 
seems to correspond to the period of rebuilding breeding herds.  It is at that time that the beef 
herds began to increase (see Figure 4.5).  Conversely, 1985 showed a peak of sheep meat 
production that could correspond with the beginning of the period of decrease in breeding 
herds.  Equally, it was from the end of 1985 that production of wool began to decline.  During 
all these years, sheep and beef production seemed to be in direct competition in the utilisation 
of resource.  Sheep production appeared more attractive, possibly because of the high level of 
government support. 
 
From 1987 to 1992, these two sectors of production had evolved approximately in the same 
way.  The drop in production from 1990 followed a period of drought which hit the main 
production areas and since then a certain increase in production can be seen.  However, it is 
necessary to note that Figures 4.4 and 4.5 show that sheep flocks decreased while the beef 
herds increased in the same years.  Maintaining the volume of sheep meat production has in 
part been due to the selling of breeding herds, which led to a drop in production in 1993 and 
the stabilisation of this production since that time.  In contrast, the increase in beef production 
turned out to be more durable and after a fall at the end of the 1990s, it reclaimed a rapid 
increase at the beginning of the 2000s. 
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Figure 4.12  Volume of pastoral production*, New Zealand, 1970-2003  
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Note: *  Sheep meat (mutton and lamb) and beef meat (beef and veal) based on bone-in weight, wool based 
on greasy and dairy based on milk fat. 
Source: Situation and Outlook for New Zealand Agriculture, MAF, various years; Department of Statistics, 
Agricultural Statistics, cat. 14.101 and 01.018.0091; New Zealand Dairy Board, Annual Report, various 
years; New Zealand Meat and Wool Boards’ Economic Service, Annual Review of the Sheep and Beef 
Industry; and our calculations. 
 
The change in dairy production displays lesser annual variability than for the two other types 
of production.  After having decreased at the beginning of the 1970s, dairy production has 
regularly increased since then, rising by 36 per cent between 1978 and 1985, the year of the 
agricultural policy reform. Since 1987, the increase in this production was continual and 
quick with a production 2.2 times higher in 2003 compared with its 1987 level.   
 
In total, following the revision of agricultural policy, the value of New Zealand agricultural 
production, in real terms, declined and returned to the level of the 1960s.  However, there has 
been an increase in the last five years (see Figure 4.11).  In contrast, in volume, the pastoral 
sector does not display a marked tendency to decline although it has declined slightly.  Dairy 
production has carried on with an increase which began in the middle of the 1970s.  Sheep 
production dropped strongly at first but this drop was compensated in large part by an 
increase in beef production.  Moreover, total meat production (see Figure 4.13), although 
considerably lower than the peak of 1985 and variable from one year to another, seems to 
have been maintained at a level higher than in the 1970s.  Growth at the beginning of the 
2000s allowed the farming sector in 2003 to be close to the record result of meat production 
in 1985. 
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Figure 4.13  Total meat production, New Zealand, 1970-2003  
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Source: Situation and Outlook for New Zealand Agriculture, MAF, various years; Department of Statistics, 
Agricultural Statistics, cat. 14.101 and 01.018.0091; New Zealand Dairy Board, Annual Report, various 
years; New Zealand Meat and Wool Boards’ Economic Service, Annual Review of the Sheep and Beef 
Industry; and our calculations. 
 
 
Figure 4.14  Deflated production price index*, New Zealand, 1970-1999 
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Note: * Production Price Index deflated by the Consumer Price Index June 1999 = 1000. 
Source: Department of Statistics, PCInfos: PPIQ.SOA; and our calculations. 
 
In consequence, as the value of production has decreased relatively more than the decrease in 
the volume of production, farm prices must also have altered.  In this way, according to 
Figure 4.14, the change in the deflated production price index indicates a sharp drop of nearly 
20 per cent in 1986.  Since a large part of the government payments to the agricultural sector 
was to support the price of sheep meat, the removal of subsidies could only lead to a lower 
market price.  Without price support the drop in real prices from 1986 continued on the 
international market until 1999 because of the decrease in the prices of the raw farm products. 
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4.3.2 The lowered value of food exports 
 
For New Zealand, having only a small internal market, the value of agrifood exports is closely 
linked with the value of agricultural production, which is shown in Figure 4.15.  In the ten 
years which preceded the reform in agricultural policy, that is from 1976 to 1985, agrifood 
exports had been, on average and in real terms (June 1999 $), close to 11.7 billion dollars per 
year.  For the following 15 years, this figure hovered around 10.6 billion per year.  Recovery 
began in 2001 and the real value of the exports was about 14 billion dollars per year.  
 
As the value of production, the value of export is reliant on the change in the international 
market price and export volumes.  These elements are shown in Figures 4.16 and 4.17 for the 
two main groups of products which constitute most of New Zealand agrifood exports, namely 
fruits and vegetables and pastoral products. 
 
Regarding fruits and vegetables, export volumes have been increasing for the whole period 
although it has stabilised since 1990.  Conversely, the export price in real terms, which was 
relatively stable until 1978, fell continually until the mid 1990s then began stabilising during 
the following years. 
 
Pastoral agricultural products have also been less remunerated in real terms on the 
international market.  This did not prevent a moderate increase in export volumes until 1985.  
Despite the sharp drop in export prices since that date, the volume of exports has been 
maintained. The prices in real terms remained quite stable, with a new fall in the mid 1990s, 
which paradoxically coincided with an increase in export volumes.   
 
Figure 4.15  Value of agrifood exports in current and constant (June 1999 = 1000) 
dollars, New Zealand, 1970-2004  
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Source: Situation and Outlook for New Zealand Agriculture, MAF, various years; Department of Statistics, 
Agricultural Statistics, cat. 14.101 and 01.018.0091; and our calculations. 
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Figure 4.16  Index of volumes and deflated* price index for exports of fruits and 
vegetables, New Zealand, 1972-2002 
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Note: * Export Price Index deflated by the Consumers Price Index, June 1999 = 1000. 
Source: Department of Statistics, PCInfos: OTIA.SE2AV2, .SE2BS2, .SE1AV2, SE1BS2; and our 
calculations. 
 
 
Figure 4.17  Index of volumes and deflated* price index for pastoral exports, New 
Zealand, 1972-2002  
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Note: * Export Price Index deflated by the Consumers Price Index, June 1999 = 1000. 
Source: Department of Statistics, PCInfos: OTIA.SE2AV2, .SE2BS2, .SE1AV2, SE1BS2; and our 
calculations. 
 
In conclusion, it seems that the drop in the value of New Zealand agrifood exports which 
lasted for about 15 years after the reform of the agricultural policy was due, more to the 
deterioration in the international market price than to the total drop in export volumes.  The 
decline of the sheep sector, as indicated by livestock and meat production, was certainly 
accentuated by the removal of subsidies.  Beef and dairy sectors have increased their exports 
at a level sufficient to compensate the drop in sheep sectors. 
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4.4 Conclusion 
 
Structural tendencies have always affected New Zealand agriculture even before the removal 
of agricultural subsidies.  The sheep sector, the most affected, had begun its decline in 1982, 
in response to a drop in the profitability of exports.  The effect of policy revision, since 1985, 
seems to have accelerated the decline in this sector, but with a certain gap due to the delay in 
modifying the use of existing resources.  This gap could also be due to the resistance capacity 
in the family farm organisation to lowered returns for their resources. 
 
The fact that the main structural changes started before 1985 could indicate that the farm 
sector was not completely isolated from the effects of the market.  Some agricultural 
producers seem to have been aware of the fact that the high levels of agricultural subsidies to 
the pastoral sector would one day end.  They had therefore already begun to change the use of 
resources in those sectors of production that were more dependent on income obtained from 
the market.  This confirms that the high level of support to the pastoral sector had only existed 
for a relatively short interlude in the economic history of New Zealand.  Further, it is likely 
that a number of farmers who benefited from the supports realised that these could only be 
expected for a short period of time, and this partially explains the relative inertia of the farm 
lobby during the revision of agricultural policy. 
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Chapter 5 
The Change in Farm Income 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter, we assumed that the change in agricultural policy and the change in 
international market prices have contributed to lowering farm sector incomes.  It is on this 
basis that we discussed the question of structural change, taking into consideration the 
possible delay of adjustment caused by the resistance capacity characteristic of the family 
organisation of production.  It is now relevant to discuss the issue of change in farm income. 
 
We will analyse the terms of exchange for the New Zealand farm sector at an overall level.  
At a micro-economic level we have a long period of annual surveys of a sample of pastoral 
farms, so we can therefore analyse the results of these surveys to understand the change in 
sheep and dairy farm incomes.  There is no distinct survey for beef farms.  Nevertheless, beef 
and sheep products are substitutable and often produced concurrently, therefore the sheep 
farm survey includes results which reflect the profitability of these two types of production. 
 
5.2 The terms of exchange for the farm sector 
 
A direct total measure of net income is not published in the New Zealand official statistics 
(Attwood 1984, p. 10).  Nevertheless, the production price index and the input cost index are 
available for a long period and their ratio, being the terms of exchange represent an indirect 
evaluation of net incomes for the New Zealand farm sector.  However, such a measure does 
not consider productivity gains and must be analysed with caution. 
 
Figure 5.1 shows that until the beginning of the 1980s, the input cost index and the production 
price index remained closely related.  With the exception of the years 1973 and 1979, when 
agricultural commodity prices were especially high, the terms of exchange in the farm sector 
stayed constant.  On the other hand, since 1981 the terms of exchange worsened, with input 
costs rising more quickly than production prices. When support price and income 
programmes were abolished in 1986, the difference between prices and costs increased even 
more.  The deterioration in terms of exchange, although variable from year to year, seems to 
have been ongoing since 1986.  Consequently, if New Zealand farmers had not changed their 
use of resources, they would have faced a decrease in their net farm income from 1981, and 
even more so since 1986. 
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Figure 5.1  Input cost index and production price index for farming, New Zealand, 1970-1999  
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Source: Department of Statistics, PCInfos: PPIQ.SOA and PPIQ.SIAF; Department of Statistics, Monthly 
Abstract of Statistics; and our calculations. 
 
The production price index is an aggregate index of prices for different commodities.  
However, the prices for different commodities do not all move in the same way at the same 
time, as shown in the next three Figures.  In regards to sheep production, 1986 seemed to be 
important in the price formation process for lamb.  In that year, the farm price for lamb 
dropped by around half for the New Zealand market (see Figure 5.2).  Because the wholesale 
price for lamb on the principal export market, United Kingdom, did not show a decrease in 
the same year, this drop in domestic farm price must be related to the abolition of price 
support and income programmes that began in 1986.  On the other hand, the variations in 
farm prices since 1990 seem to result from the export market behaviour. 
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Figure 5.2  Farm lamb price in New Zealand ($/head) and wholesale price for New Zealand 
lamb on the London market ($NZ/kg), 1975-2004  
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Source: Situation and Outlook for New Zealand Agriculture, MAF, various years; Department of Statistics, 
Agricultural Statistics, cat. 14.101 and 01.018.0091; NZMWB Economic Service, Annual Review of NZ 
Sheep and Beef Industry; and our calculations. 
 
The analysis of the decrease of farm prices for beef and milk is entirely different from that of 
the lamb market.  In the case of beef, the decrease in farm price corresponds to a decrease in 
the wholesale price in New York for New Zealand beef (see Figure 5.3).  For the dairy sector, 
the decrease in farm prices in 1986, 1987 and 1991 corresponds to a decrease in the selling 
price of dairy products on the world market23 (see Figure 5.4).  Farm prices in New Zealand 
for beef and dairy products are closely linked to export prices for the observed period.  The 
abolition of state support programmes to the farm sector does not seem to have affected this 
relationship. 
 
                                                 
23  To allow a better view of the change in the world price, a simple average of prices for the three main export 
dairy products (butter, cheddar cheese and skim milk powder) was calculated.   
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Figure 5.3  Farm beef price in New Zealand and wholesale price for New Zealand beef 
on the New York Market ($NZ/kg), 1975-2004  
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Source: Situation and Outlook for New Zealand Agriculture, MAF, various years; Department of Statistics, 
Agricultural Statistics, cat. 14.101 and 01.018.0091; NZMWB Economic Service, Annual Review of NZ 
Sheep and Beef Industry; and our calculations. 
 
 
Figure 5.4  Farm dairy price in New Zealand ($NZ/kg) and average price of butter, cheddar and 
skim milk powder on the world market ($NZ/tonne), 1979-2004  
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Source: Situation and Outlook for New Zealand Agriculture, MAF, various years; Department of Statistics, 
Agricultural Statistics, cat. 14.101 and 01.018.0091; MAF, non-published data; PCInfos, OCDE data; 
FAOSTAT and our calculations. 
 
All things considered, this brief analysis of the change in the major farm product prices 
confirms once more that the sheep sector was the principal victim of the New Zealand 
agricultural reform policy.  In other respects, the structural analysis conducted in the previous 
chapter shows that New Zealand farmers have reacted to the changing economic conditions 
by altering the types of production and the output levels.  To have a better assessment of the 
adaptation strategies implemented at the farm level, a more detailed analysis of the change in 
incomes must be conducted for the major products of the pastoral sector. 
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5.3 The economic results for sheep farms 
 
The New Zealand Meat & Wool Boards’ Economic Service (NZMWB) has carried out an 
annual survey for more than 40 years based on a sample of sheep farms.  This survey provides 
physical data on production and a financial description of the farms investigated.  To qualify 
for inclusion in the sample, a farm has to winter at least 750 sheep24.  Likewise, at least 70 per 
cent of gross revenue must be derived from beef and sheep cattle.  The sample is stratified on 
a geographical basis and by sheep flock size into eight farming subgroups (South Island High 
Country farms, North Island intensive finishing farms, etc.).  The results for all the farms of 
the sample are presented on a weighted average basis reflecting the importance of each 
subgroup in the total population (NZMWB 1993). 
 
The sampling constitutes in itself a limit to the relevance of the data to assessing farmers' 
adjustment to the new policy.  In fact, some farms that have largely modified the use of their 
resources are now excluded from the sample.  For example, a farmer could have reduced 
sheep numbers to less than the minimum of 750 sheep wintered in order to keep other 
livestock or for increasing the commercial crop area where the climate allows it.  Thus, the 
results of the survey can, in fact, minimise the effect of adjustment that farmers could have 
made because it includes only farmers for whom sheep production remains the most 
important activity.  However, the survey does provide an economic and financial picture of 
specialised sheep farms and analysis of survey data remains relevant to our purpose. 
 
5.3.1 The long-term change in incomes 
 
The change of net income and drawings by the owners for all the farms in the sample for the 
last 35 years is shown in Figure 5.5.  The net income is the amount available to the farmer and 
their family to remunerate the owner’s equity and non-paid labour, and to reduce the principal 
on borrowing.  All the operational expenses have been accounted for, including depreciation 
and interest costs.  The drawings by the owner include the amount withdrawn from the farm 
business during the year to provide for living costs. 
 
 
                                                 
24 Prior to 1974, the minimum was 500 sheep. 
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Figure 5.5  Net farm income and drawings in current $ on sheep farms, New Zealand, 1967-
2004. 
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Source: NZ Meat and Wool Boards’ Economic Service, Sheep and Beef Farm Survey, various years; and 
our calculations. 
 
For the entire survey period, net income and drawings have been rising.  However, we 
observe a large variability in the net income from year to year whereas the drawings are 
relatively less variable.  Indeed, even if the net income varies a lot, New Zealand farmers tried 
to maintain their standard of living.  Apart from the decrease in the net income in 1986 due to 
the abolition of the government’s policy of price support, the positive or negative deviations 
correspond generally to the price variations of mutton products and beef meat on the 
international market. Thus, the exceptional increase in the net income from 2000 corresponds 
to a similar rise in the beef and lamb prices on the reference markets for the export (see 
Figures 5.2 and 5.3). 
 
In real terms, net income as well as drawings, have tended to decrease until the mid 1980s 
until a peak was reached in 1973 (see Figure 5.6).  The beginning of the liquidation of the 
sheep flock in 1982, which we observed in the previous chapter (see Figure 4.4), coincided 
with net income falling below $40,000, in constant 1999 dollars.  The significant drop in net 
income noted in 1986, although important, is part of a long-term trend that began in the early 
1970s.  This trend occurred in spite of the increase in government support to the farm sector 
from the beginning of the 1970s, even with the exceptionally high levels of support from 1982 
to 1985 (see Figure 3.1). The drastic drop in support and the end of the stabilisation 
programmes, which caused an additional decrease in income level in 1986, do not seem to 
have had long-term effects since then.  Paradoxically, since 1987 without any stabilisation 
policy net income has been more stable from year to year than in the remainder of the 
observation period.  In addition, the tendency for long-term decrease in net income appears to 
break down.  Finally, it was only due to the simultaneous increase in beef and lamb prices 
from the year 2000 that the net income in real terms reached the threshold of $40,000 per 
farm again.   
 
The change in drawings in real terms shows a less significant annual variation than for net 
income (see Figure 5.6).  Since 1987, a plateau seems to have been reached but at a level 
around 40 per cent less than the peak reached in 1974.  Consequently, the standard of living 
allowed by farming activity for the families involved in sheep farming decreased for most of 
the period under review.  The end of state support programmes to this sector probably 
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contributed to the last significant drop in the standard of living in 1986, but since it seems to 
have stabilised and from the beginning of the 1990s progressively reached its previous level. 
 
On the other hand, despite this stabilisation of the standard of living, the drawings as a 
percentage of net income were relatively high from the mid 1970s and until 2000 (see Figure 
5.7).  Since 1987, the drawings remain steady typically at more than 80 per cent of net 
income, a level above the range of 50 per cent to 75 per cent observed for most of the years 
since 1968.  In addition, the farmers tried to keep the drawings in absolute value relatively 
constant.  It is normal that the share of these drawings in the net income is higher when the 
net income is decreasing, and vice versa.  Moreover, a heavy drop in the net income could 
drive drawings higher than the level of the net income. Such results weaken the economic 
situation of the sheep farms.  This could not have been maintained in the medium term, unless 
a recourse to non-farm funds was available to at least maintain their standard of living. 
 
Figure 5.6  Net farm income and drawings in real terms on sheep farms, New Zealand, 1967-
2004  
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Source: NZ Meat and Wool Boards’ Economic Service, Sheep and Beef Farm Survey, various years; and 
our calculations. 
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Figure 5.7  Drawings as percentage of net farm income on sheep farms, New Zealand, 1968-2002 
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Source: NZ Meat and Wool Boards’ Economic Service, Sheep and Beef Farm Survey, various years; and 
our calculations. 
 
5.3.2 An increase in productivity 
 
As we have seen in Chapter 1 when we discussed adoption of new technologies, an increase 
in productivity, to produce more with less resource, is a first possible reaction to a drop in 
incomes.  The results of the New Zealand Meat and Wool Boards’ survey provide some 
physical data that allows us to assess the change in farm productivity.  The total livestock 
carried, by farm and by hectare, provide a first measure of total productivity.  In regards to the 
utilisation of inputs, it is interesting to look at the use of fertilisers, which represent a major 
farm expense. Finally, we have already discussed the possibility of under-remunerating 
family labour and it is therefore necessary to scrutinise this issue in regards to the productivity 
of labour. 
 
First, at the level of the total productivity of sheep farms, the total number of stock units was 
relatively constant between 1981 and 1994 (see Figure 5.8). However, the relative importance 
of the various types of livestock changed at the expense of the sheep which were decreasing 
in number between 1982 and 1994, although they remained the most important livestock.  
Other livestock grew and more than counterbalanced the drop in stock units caused by the 
reduction in sheep. For example, beef stock grew significantly in 1993 and 1994.  Since then, 
all the livestock have increased moderately during the rest of the observed period. 
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Figure 5.8  Total stock units and by type of livestock on sheep farms, New Zealand, 1981-2004  
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Source: NZ Meat and Wool Boards’ Economic Service, Sheep and Beef Farm Survey, various years; and 
our calculations. 
 
The results for sheep farms are not entirely consistent with those observed for the livestock 
data for all of New Zealand (see Figures 4.4 to 4.5).  Here, the decrease in the number of 
sheep is less significant than previously observed and the total number of stock units in New 
Zealand is decreasing, not growing.  This divergence in the results can be explained by the 
sampling method that allows only the specialised sheep farms to be surveyed.  Having said 
this, the tendency of the last ten years to substitute sheep for beef is well illustrated by the 
results of the survey. 
 
In terms of productivity, the change in the average livestock units per farm must be examined 
in relation to the area owned for estimating the carrying capacity per hectare, and this data are 
shown in Figure 5.9.  The stock units per hectare fluctuate from year to year.  For the whole 
period of observation, the number of stock units per hectare has been on average 6.6 stock 
units. As a consequence, on the basis of this criteria the policy change does not seem to have 
led to an increase in productivity. 
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Figure 5.9  Units per hectare on sheep farms, New Zealand, 1981-2002  
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Source: NZ Meat and Wool Boards’ Economic Service, Sheep and Beef Farm Survey, various years; and 
our calculations. 
 
However, although the average stock units per hectare did not change after 1985, Figure 5.10 
shows that the stock units per tonne of fertiliser decreased almost by a half in 1986.  First, the 
farmers chose to drastically cut the purchase of fertilisers.  For the subsequent years, this ratio 
increased to some extent but until the beginning of the 1990s, it maintained a level much 
lower than the one during 1981 and 1985.  The interpretation of this result can pose some 
difficulties: is it an improvement in productivity, or a potential deterioration in the long term 
fertility of land?  In fact, the results show it was a deterioration of the productive capacity of 
the soil as the sheep breeders increased the use of fertiliser per stock unit levels to a higher 
level than before the agricultural policy reform which ended the support for this kind of input.  
Figure 5.10  Kilograms of fertiliser used per stock units on sheep farms, New Zealand, 1982-2004  
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Source: NZ Meat and Wool Boards’ Economic Service, Sheep and Beef Farm Survey, various years; and 
our calculations. 
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Concerning the availability of labour, the number of labour units per farm25 has decreased 
since 1982 (see Figure 5.11).  However, this decrease was pronounced from 1985, resulting in 
a clear increase in productivity per labour unit, calculated by the number of stock units per 
labour unit.  This increase was maintained until the end of the 1990s, when a plateau was 
reached.  Thus, the number of stock units per labour unit in 2002 is 27 per cent higher than 
the average for the years 1981 to 1985, and that means an important gain in labour 
productivity.  
 
In short, the productivity of land calculated by the number of stock units per hectare did not 
fluctuate in spite of a significant drop in the use of fertiliser.  Likewise, the per labour unit 
productivity increased considerably in recent years.  Consequently, productivity in the sense 
of less inputs used for slightly increasing livestock numbers has risen since 1986. 
Figure 5.11  Total labour units per farm and stock units per labour unit on sheep farms, New 
Zealand, 1981-2002  
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Source: NZ Meat and Wool Boards’ Economic Service, Sheep and Beef Farm Survey, various years; and our 
calculations. 
 
5.3.3 Income and expenditure 
 
An analysis of income and expenditure allows us to understand the internal strategies used by 
sheep farmers to face the decrease in market prices.  Firstly, the physical data on livestock and 
wool sales show a decline in sheep production (see Figure 5.12).  Lamb and wool sales 
decreased from 1985 until the mid 1990s, even though sheep livestock in the sheep farms 
increased (see Figure 5.8). 
 
These fluctuations in stock sales partially affected the level of gross income (see Figure 5.13).  
Indeed, the respective contribution of wool and lamb sales has varied significantly during the 
observation period, because of the fluctuations in market prices.  Despite a decrease of the 
part of gross income which came from sheep production (wool and sheep and lamb meat) 
from a maximum of 74.4 per cent in 1982 to a minimum of 58.6 per cent in 1992, this sector 
remains the main one contributing to gross income.  In 2004, the gross income from the sheep 
production was 70 per cent of the total income.  This result is not surprising since the sample 
                                                 
25 "This includes the owner’s labour and all permanent and casual labour, but excludes all contract labour such 
as shearing, fencing and scrub cutting" (NZMWB 1993, p. 13). 
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includes only sheep farms.  However, whereas the gross income from the sale of wool 
represented on average 40 per cent of the total in the 1980s, they were no more than 18 per 
cent of the total gross income of the sheep farms in 2004.  Sheep and lamb production for 
meat became larger, changing from 34 per cent of the gross income in 1981 to a drop of 21 
per cent in 1989, finally increasing gradually to 52 per cent in 2004.  
 
Despite this, gross income from beef production, which was around 16 per cent of the total 
from 1981 to 1985, reached a peak (32 per cent) in 1993, then fell to 24 per cent on average 
for the last ten years.  Income from other products principally generated by commercial crops, 
have decreased constantly over the whole period to represent only 7 per cent of the total 
incomes in 2004. 
 
Figure 5.12  Sales of lamb, sheep and beef (number of head) and wool (in kg) on sheep farms, 
New Zealand, 1982-2002  
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Source: NZ Meat and Wool Boards’ Economic Service, Sheep and Beef Farm Survey, various years; and our 
calculations. 
 
Therefore, sheep farmers’ medium-term adaptation strategy with regard to their income has 
been to partially replace sheep production with beef production.  In terms of expenditure, their 
reactions were faster with a sudden change in 1986.  For the first time, total expenditure in 
current dollars decreased (see Figure 5.14).  In fact, all types of expenditure that could be 
decreased appear to have decreased. As we have already seen, fertiliser expenditure was 
drastically cut, as were the expenditure for repairs and maintenance. The recovery of this 
expenditure was very slow and only reached the 1985 level in current dollars in 1993. After 
this time, the growth was slow until 2000 when the improvement of incomes (see Figure 5.5) 
seemed to support a new increase in expenditure.  
 
The charges for labour, animal health (including weed and pest control), and for contract 
work also decreased in 1986 (see Figure 5.15).  After this time, they follow the same 
behaviour as the other expenditure: moderate increase until 2000 then a strong rise.  
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Figure 5.13  Gross income by product on sheep farms, New Zealand, 1982-2004  
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Source: NZ Meat and Wool Boards’ Economic Service, Sheep and Beef Farm Survey, various years; and 
our calculations. 
 
Finally, standing charges and interest charges seemed to be, in the short-term, out of the 
farmer's immediate control.  Both these charges are the only ones that grew rapidly after 1985 
(see Figure 5.16).  The initial increase in the interest charges resulted from the removal of 
subsidised interest rates and the general increase in interest rates.  In 1988 the sheep breeders 
seemed to have gained control of the changes in both these expenditures. Similarly, the 
decrease in interest charges from 1988 must be attributed to the general decrease in interest 
rates.  Despite the general rise in the expenditure from 2000, interest charges have not 
followed the same progression, enjoying the low general level of the interest rates (see Figure 
3.4). 
 
 62
Figure 5.14  Change in expenditure in fertiliser and seeds, repairs and maintenance*, and total 
(in current $) on Sheep Farms, New Zealand, 1981-2002. 
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Note: *Includes vehicles, fuel and electricity. 
Source: NZ Meat and Wool Boards’ Economic Service, Sheep and Beef Farm Survey, various years; 
and our calculations. 
 
 
Figure 5.15  Change in expenditure in wages, animal health* and contract work** (in 
current $) on sheep farms, New Zealand, 1981-2002  
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Note: *Includes feed and grazing expenses and weed and pest control. 
          ** Includes shearing expenses. 
Source: NZ Meat and Wool Boards’ Economic Service, Sheep and Beef Farm Survey, various years; 
and our calculations. 
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Figure 5.16  Change in standing and interest charges (in current $) on sheep farms, New 
Zealand, 1981-2002  
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Source: NZ Meat and Wool Boards’ Economic Service, Sheep and Beef Farm Survey, various years; and 
our calculations. 
 
 
Figure 5.17  Debt and net worth in current $ on sheep farms, New Zealand, 1981-2002  
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Source: NZ Meat and Wool Boards’ Economic Service, Sheep and Beef Farm Survey, various years; and 
our calculations. 
 
It is important to note that the control of expenditure was also extended to control of debt.  In 
fact, the debt progression has followed the same changes as total expenditure.  Nevertheless, 
the economic fluctuations suffered by the sheep farmers have an amplified effect on their net 
worth (see Figure 5.17).  From 1985, the drop in their net worth was particularly large and its 
increase has been quasi exponential from 2000.  The total asset has also been increasing since 
then. 
 
In total, it appears that farmers’ adaptation strategy has allowed them to control the change in 
total expenditure.  In current dollars, expenditure only increased by six per cent between 1985 
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and 199226 even though from 1981 to 1985 it increased by nearly 60 per cent.  This control of 
expenditure has broadly contributed to stopping the drop in net farm income in real terms (see 
Figure 5.6). After 1992, total expenditure remained under control with an increase of 32 per 
cent between 1993 and 1999, but from 2000 they exploded, increasing by 32 per cent in only 
three years.  Since 2000, total expenditure has increased, as has the total debt per farm.  This 
recent change could have been due to a potential drop in the prices on the world market or an 
increase in the interest rates. 
 
To face the crisis caused by the abolition of governmental support in 1986, the sheep farmers 
also had to establish a strategy to diversify their incomes.  Thus, whereas from 1981 to 1985 
the cash incomes from non-farming activities counted for 18 per cent of the available funds, 
this proportion increased to reach an average of 22 per cent between 1986 and 1999.  Only 
from 2000 has the share of non-farm funds decreased on average to reach 22 per cent during 
the last three years of our period of observation27.  Thus, the maintenance of the level of 
drawings after the abolition of the support for the sheep sector in 1986 (see Figure 5.5), in 
spite of the marked decrease in net farm income, was sustained by increased use of off-farm 
funds.  It is therefore obvious that sheep farmers have been more dependent on off-farm funds 
since 1986. 
 
5.3.4 A general strategy of adaptation 
 
We have seen that net farm income in real terms was clearly falling for a long period 
beginning in 1973 and ending in 1986.  This drop was to some extent accentuated in 1986 
with the end of government price and income support.  Faced with this declining income, 
sheep farmers implemented a general strategy of adjusting to changing economic realities.  In 
general terms this strategy can be seen as having two components: those that concern on-farm 
adjustments and those that concern off-farm adjustments.  Regarding on-farm adjustments we 
have noted first an increase in the productivity of fertiliser and of labour.  At the level of the 
choice of type of production, beef production has been expanded at the expense of sheep 
production. And finally, there was close control of costs.  Despite these important adjustments 
at the production level, an external strategy had to be used, namely growing reliance on off-
farm funds.  Thus since 1987, partially due to this general strategy of adaptation, net farm 
income as well as drawings have been maintained in real terms and the net farm income has 
increased from 2000 thanks to the enhancement of the sale price on the international markets. 
 
5.4 The economic results of dairy farms 
 
From 1964 to 1985/86, the New Zealand Dairy Board (NZDB) conducted an economic survey 
using an annual sample of factory supply dairy farms.  This survey was interrupted for two 
years and then resumed in 1988/89 by the Livestock Improvement Corporation Limited 
(LICL).  Despite this gap of two years in the data during an important time in the elaboration 
of New Zealand agricultural programmes, the survey provides relevant data for analysing the 
change in the economic results of dairy farms. 
 
                                                 
26 In real terms, the total expenditures were clearly decreasing as the index of the input cost increased in 30 per 
cent between 1985 and 1992. 
27 NZ Meat and Wool Boards’ Economic Service, Sheep and Beef Farm Survey, various years: Fairweather 
1992; and our calculations. 
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This survey is based on a random sample of factory supply dairy farmers.  The data used here 
include only the farms operated by their owners and excludes sharemilkers.  To be included in 
the survey, until 1985/86 the farm must have had more than 30 cows and more than 75 per 
cent of its income must have come from dairy production; since 1988/89 the percentage of 
income must have been 50 per cent (LICL 1993 and NZDB 1987). 
 
As we saw in the beginning of this chapter, the milk price at the farm gate during the 
observation period moved closely to the world market price for dairy products (see Figure 
5.4).  Thus, the decrease in agricultural subsidies did not seem to have affected the farm price, 
contrary to the situation observed in the sheep sector.  The data regarding the change in net 
income for the dairy farms confirms this first observation (see Figure 5.18). On the whole, net 
farm income changes closely with the annual price for production.  In the light of these 
results, the increase in the volume of dairy output observed since 1978 (see Figure 4.12) 
seems to be explained by the improvement of the absolute and relative profitability of dairy 
production, especially if it is compared with sheep production. 
 
This increased profitability has encouraged an expansion of average dairy production per farm 
(see Figure 5.19).  The average number of cows per farm is increasing in a similar way to 
total milkfat output.  However, the increase in total output does not result from an 
improvement of yield per cow, this growing relatively slowly since the beginning of the 
1980s (see Figure 5.20).  There are nevertheless apparent gains of productivity in the use of 
land because the output of milkfat per hectare grew more than 65 per cent between 1975 and 
1989.  This criteria plateaued at the beginning of the 1990s but shows a 40 per cent 
improvement between 1993 and 2003.  
 
Figure 5.18  Dairy farm net income in current and constant $ (1999 $), New Zealand, 1975-2003  
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Source: Livestock Improvement Corporation Limited, 1993 Economic Survey of Factory Supply Dairy 
Farmers; New Zealand Dairy Board, Dexcel, An Economic Survey of Factory Supply Dairy Farms in New 
Zealand, various years; and our calculations. 
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Figure 5.19  Average number of cows and total output by dairy farms, New Zealand, 1975-2003  
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Source: Livestock Improvement Corporation Limited, 1993 Economic Survey of Factory Supply Dairy 
Farmers; New Zealand Dairy Board, Dexcel, An Economic Survey of Factory Supply Dairy Farms in New 
Zealand, various years; and our calculations. 
 
 
Figure 5.20  Average output per cow and per hectare on dairy farms, New Zealand, 1975-2003  
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Source: Livestock Improvement Corporation Limited, 1993 Economic Survey of Factory Supply Dairy 
Farmers; New Zealand Dairy Board, Dexcel, An Economic Survey of Factory Supply Dairy Farms in New 
Zealand, various years; and our calculations. 
 
To sum up, dairy production has been encouraged by a general increase in farm gate prices 
during recent years, which has also lead to an increase in net farm income.  Consequently, the 
changes in agricultural policy seem to have had little effect in this sector.  No specific 
adaptation strategy seems to have been implemented by dairy farmers apart from a steady 
increase in output and a relative intensification of land use.  A brief analysis of the change in 
dairy farm expenditures does not show any major adjustments in the relative emphasis given 
to different types of expenditure.   
 
 67
5.5 The change in farm incomes in relation to average income in the New 
Zealand economy 
 
An analysis of the change in farm income in the sheep and dairy sectors shows two different 
realities.  It is obvious that the dairy sector has benefited from a relatively good situation 
allowing an increase in net farm income in real terms since 1981 (see Figure 5.18).  
Conversely, net farm income and drawings decreased for a long period in the sheep sector 
before showing a clear improvement since 2000 (see Figure 5.6). 
 
To conclude this analysis of the change in incomes, it is relevant to consider the change in 
household income for the New Zealand economy as a whole.  Indeed, it is not only the farm 
sector that has been affected by the reform of New Zealand economic policy and by the 
economic crisis at the beginning of the 1980s and the 1990s. Therefore, despite some 
deterioration, the change in farm incomes could be relatively favourable when compared with 
the rest of the economy.  However, this is not the case for the sheep sector since net income 
has been declining significantly since 1981 in comparison with the average household income 
(see Figure 5.21).  
 
The dairy sector shows better performance than the whole economy.  Since 1981, net farm 
income shows a relatively favourable change compared to average household income. The 
increase noted for dairy production during the whole period of observation is likely to be one 
of the reasons for that result.  
 
Figure 5.21 Change in New Zealand average household income, net farm income on dairy farms 
and net farm income on sheep farms, in real terms, 1981-2004  
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Source: Department of Statistics, Cat 04.001; NZ Meat and Wool Boards’ Economic Service, Sheep and 
Beef Farm Survey, various years; Livestock Improvement Corporation Limited, 1993 Economic Survey of 
Factory Supply Dairy Farmers; New Zealand Dairy Board, Dexcel, An Economic Survey of Factory Supply 
Dairy Farms in New Zealand; and our calculations. 
 
While we do not have data from surveys on the change in income for the other types of 
agricultural production, we know that for the farm sector as a whole in terms of exchange 
have deteriorated since 1981.  However, this measurement does not allow a comparison 
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between the change in agricultural income and income in the rest of the economy.  Figure 
5.22 addresses this question by comparing GDP per person in labour force with farm sector 
GDP per person involved in farming.  It is an indirect and incomplete measurement of the 
change in farm income, but it gives some information about the direction of this change. 
 
Figure 5.22  Change in the GDP per person in labour force and the farm sector GDP per person 
involved in farming, New Zealand, 1976-1992 
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Source: Department of Statistics, PCInfos; Fairweather 1992, non-published data; and our calculations. 
 
We note that the farm sector GDP per capita in 1976 was at the same level as the total GDP 
per person in labour force.  It is only from 1981, with the beginning of the deterioration in the 
terms of exchange for the farm sector, that farm sector GDP has shown an unfavourable 
change relative to total GDP, always on a per capita basis.  The gap between these two data 
sets widened from 1985 to 1987, at the height of the reform of general economic policy and 
agricultural policy.  On this basis, the economic situation of the farm sector seems to have 
deteriorated relative to the total. 
 
5.6 Conclusion 
 
The analysis in this Chapter shows a deterioration of incomes in the farm sector compared 
with the rest of the economy.  The sheep sector was particularly affected by the abolition of 
price support in 1986 and by the decrease of farm gate prices that resulted from it.  However, 
this sector had falling relative farm incomes since the beginning of the 1970s, and the year 
1986 emphasised this tendency. On the other hand, the dairy sector has benefited from some 
recovery in prices on the international market.  For this sector, incomes in real terms have 
been on average higher since 1989 than those obtained during the period 1981-1986. 
 
For the sheep sector, the most affected by the reform of agricultural policy, the detailed 
results from the surveys show that the farmers implemented an overall strategy to counter the 
decrease in their income.  First, on the farm, they undertook actions to increase their 
productivity, to diversify towards beef production and to control expenditure.  Resorting to 
off-farm funds was also important for allowing farmers to maintain their standard of living.  
This adaptation strategy combined with an amelioration of export prices allowed sheep 
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farmers to stabilise their income since 1987, despite the abolition of all kinds of support price 
and income programmes. 
 
For the dairy sector, the analysis of the survey results does not allow us to detect a particular 
strategy of response, apart from a constant increase in the number of cows and in the level of 
production per farm.  This increase resulted from the relatively favourable change in dairy 
product prices and farm income. 
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Chapter 6 
General Conclusion 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
The objective of this research was to analyse the effects on the farm sector of the 1985 reform 
of New Zealand agricultural policy.  We have framed this analysis at a more general level as 
an issue relating to the specificity of the farm sector and in the context of agricultural policy 
in developed countries.  Before presenting the summary of our research and a discussion of 
the results regarding this issue, we note some limitations to our analysis. 
 
6.2 The limitations of this research 
 
The first limitation of this research is that the methods applied do not allow us to formally 
reach a conclusion on the effects of the change of agricultural policy.  We have favoured an 
approach that has combined many long-term indicators and only examined these if the 
tendencies observed were either modified or not following the change of agricultural policy.  
But too many factors are involved in the case of the New Zealand farm sector to establish a 
formal link of cause and effect between the reform of agricultural policy, the structural and 
the economic changes in this sector.  Notably the general internal and external economic 
conditions in New Zealand have a major impact on the farm sector, including: the exchange 
rate, interest rates, the level of inflation and international market prices.  Having said this, the 
summation of partial indicators that we have collected shows the nature and the extent of 
effects, or the lack of effects in some cases, of the reform of the agricultural policy. 
 
In addition, we have to note that our analysis emphasises the measurement of easily 
quantifiable structural and income data.  However, in doing this, our research neglects the 
effects that could occur at the level of the farmers' families who have suffered a period of 
heavy stress.  Also, we have not quantified the social and economic consequences suffered by 
the rural communities following the reform of agricultural policy.  Notably, Walker and Bell 
emphasise that the service industry was heavily affected by the farmers’ decrease in input 
expenditure, and this factor led to a major restructuring of this industry.  This process has 
contributed significantly to reducing the economic activity of rural communities (Walker and 
Bell 1994).  Despite these considerations, our research has identified important lessons about 
the structural and economic changes that have taken place in recent years in the New Zealand 
farm sector.  But this research does not intend to go beyond this level. 
 
Finally, it is relevant to ask what can be learnt for other developed countries from this 
analysis of the New Zealand case.  On that subject, Cloke emphasised that: 
 
Information here might be relevant when comparing the New Zealand case 
with the political economy arena of agriculture elsewhere in the developed 
world.  Certainly various specificities of the New Zealand example make such 
comparisons very difficult.  For example, the state in New Zealand is 
extremely centralized and the political class is very small, in line with the scale 
of society…  Nevertheless a study of the New Zealand example does at least 
illustrate the types of policy-making conditions under which agricultural 
deregulation has been embraced (Cloke 1989). 
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But it was in the limited context of the process of formulation of economic policies that Cloke 
made his comment.  Regarding the effects in the farm sector following the reform of 
agricultural policy in New Zealand, it is not appropriate to think that they are entirely 
reproducible in another national context.  The economic and political environment in New 
Zealand is specific enough to invalidate generalisation.  In addition, the farm sector in New 
Zealand has some distinctive characteristics, as we will see later.  However, this limitation 
does not mean that there are no lessons for other countries to be learnt from research on the 
New Zealand case.  We note here that such extrapolation must be cautiously made. 
 
6.3 Summary 
 
In New Zealand, the economic crisis led to a reform of government intervention in the whole 
economy.  At the end of the 1970s and at the beginning of the 1980s, all macro-economic 
indicators converged to show the mediocre performance of the economy.  Annual deficits and 
public debts were increasing and the balance of payments deteriorated quickly.  Full 
employment was no longer guaranteed and unemployment became a significant problem.  
Finally, inflation was high.  Major economic reforms were implemented from 1984.  The 
New Zealand farm sector was at the centre of the reform because of its historical importance 
in economic development in the country, and more importantly, the government’s rapid 
increase in financial support to the sector. 
 
The farm sector, and in particular the heavily subsidised sheep sector, was hit strongly by 
general economic policy changes and by the reform of agricultural policy.  Programmes to 
develop investment, income support and stabilisation policies, and input subsidies were all 
quickly dismantled.  The expenditure of the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries (MAF), 
which had been maintained at more than six percent of the value of agricultural output 
between 1972 and 1985, was drastically reduced.  From 1990, the level of expenditure 
returned at a level equivalent to that of the 1960s, at two percent of the value of agricultural 
output. 
 
In order to help farmers through the unfavourable economic conditions and to adapt to the 
new economic environment of agricultural policy, the government put in place some 
transitional programmes.  These programmes had the objective of lightening the burden of 
farmers’ debt and a part of this debt was written off. It seems that such transitional 
programmes were effective and fewer than expected farmers left the farm sector. 
 
The agricultural policy remaining in the 1990s consisted of programmes of research, advisory 
service, animal health and inspection.  Most of these programmes were subjected to a policy 
of recovering costs from the users.  Also maintained was the power of the marketing boards to 
intervene on the export markets with a central role for exporting some agricultural products.  
This power of intervention by the marketing boards has been maintained despite the 
significant deregulation undertaken in the whole economy.  Thus the New Zealand farm 
sector was not entirely deregulated initially. The substitution of the Marketing Board by 
private companies occurred later at the end of the 1990s, 15 years after the reform.  In fact, 
the governmental authorities seem to have let the concentration be effective in order to 
maintain the market power of a single private company on the international market. 
 
It is important to note that the period when the transfer payments to the farm sector were high 
was relatively short in the history of agricultural development in New Zealand.  It started in 
the middle of the 1970s and lasted for about 10 years.  This makes the New Zealand 
experience in state intervention in the farm sector unique among the developed countries. 
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At the structural level, the reform of agricultural policy did not lead to major disruption.  The 
abolition of transfer payments did not seem to noticeably modify the structural trends which 
were already occurring.  The total number of farms had been increasing during the period 
1970-1990.  It was only from 1990 that the number of farms began to decrease, but as new 
methods for data gathering were used from 1993, this prevents us from drawing a conclusion 
on this point.  The increase in the number of farms over such a long period may have been the 
effect of two main causes.  First, the growing focus of horticultural production rather than 
traditional pastoral production on smaller farm units is certainly a cause. Second, the 
increasing number of small farms classed as lifestyle blocks is also an important factor. 
 
However, the sheep sector has decreased in importance since 1982.  The number of sheep 
farms and the sheep flock later reached a peak then decreased until 2001.  This decline was 
accelerated at the end of the 1980s, with a delay of some years after the drastic cut of transfer 
payments to the sheep sector.  This situation seems to have lead to growth of other sectors of 
traditional pastoral production, namely beef and dairy.  Also, the diversification of the New 
Zealand farm sector already undertaken in the 1970s was pursued in the horticultural sector 
and in deer production. 
 
During the years following the reform of agricultural policy, the value of agricultural output 
in real terms declined to the level of the 1960s.  On the other hand, this decrease of the value 
of output is mostly related to the change in farm prices rather than a drop in volume of 
production.  Indeed, sheep production was decreasing but this decrease was compensated in 
part by the growth of the beef and dairy sectors.  Concerning the price of farm products, it is 
obvious that the end of the support price programmes led to a drop of sheepmeat farm prices, 
since these were the most subsidised.  The decrease in price that occurred in 1986 was 
recovered on the international markets after about five years. 
 
As for exports, they decreased in real terms in 1986 and kept the same level during the 
following 15 years.  This decrease was more related to a deterioration of export prices than a 
marked decrease of export volumes. Regarding export volumes, whereas they had been 
increasing for a long period, they levelled off in the years following the reform of the 
agricultural policy.  The increase in volumes of dairy and beef products has compensated the 
decline of sheep production but not at a level allowing a resumption in the growth of exports. 
However, the recovery of an increase in exports occurred from the beginning of the 1990s. 
 
It is necessary to emphasise yet again the essential element of the analysis of structural 
change of the New Zealand farm sector.  Following the reform of agricultural policy in 1985, 
the structural trends observed at the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s were not 
significantly modified.  Only the decline of the sheep sector which accelerated with a delay of 
some years shows an unusual structural trend.  The decline was linked to growth in the beef 
sector. 
 
With regard to the change in farm incomes, once again the analysis over a long period shows 
that the main trends were at work before the reform of agricultural policy.  The terms of 
exchange for the farm sector as a whole began to deteriorate at the beginning of the 1980s.  
However the production price index showed a significant drop in 1986, which accentuated the 
deterioration of the terms of exchange.  It is necessary to note that for the beef, dairy and fruit 
sectors, the change in farm prices in New Zealand followed closely the fluctuations of prices 
on international markets.  On the other hand, in the sheep sector the abolition of support price 
programmes produced a considerable effect in 1986.  The farm price then greatly decreased 
even when the price on the principal export market was increasing.  Since then, the 
international market became, as for other sectors, the principal factor affecting farm prices. 
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The analysis of economic and financial results of sheep farms shows that net farm income 
decreased strongly in 1986.  However this decrease in net income in real terms is part of a 
long-term trend which began in the middle of the 1970s even when the transfer payments to 
the sector were increasing.  Thus, considering this perspective, the year 1986 only intensified 
the decrease in net income already experienced over the long term. 
 
After this time, sheep farmers adopted an overall strategy for facing the changing economic 
environment, and the strategy contributed to reducing the decline in their incomes. Farm 
productivity increased in the sense that output per unit of fertiliser and labour increased.  The 
proportion of income coming from beef production increased to the detriment of sheep 
production. It seems that all that could be done to reduce expenditure was done.  In particular, 
expenditure for fertiliser and for repairs and maintenance has decreased permanently.  In fact, 
only the standing and interest charges have increased and these were out of farmers’ control in 
the short term.  Finally, to maintain the level of drawings by the farm owner which clearly 
fluctuated less than net farm income, other sources of funds external to farming have been 
used. 
 
In the dairy sector, the analysis economic results of farms show that the reform of agricultural 
policy seems to have had little effect.  Indeed, during recent years, milk prices at the farm gate 
have generally increased which has led to an increase of net farm income as well. 
 
Finally, in comparison with the changes in income in the rest of the economy, given by the 
change in average household income, net farm income obtained on dairy farms has changed 
favourably since 1984.  In contrast, the situation is the reverse for sheep farms which suffered 
a deterioration of their income relative to the rest of the economy from 1986 and it was only 
from 2000 that the situation was restored. 
 
6.4 The specificity of the farm sector questioned 
 
The analysis of the effects of the revision of agricultural policy in New Zealand shows that 
the farm sector could maintain its level of economic activities despite a significant reduction 
in state support.  Does this analysis indicate that the specificity of the farm sector in New 
Zealand is similar to other developed countries as we discussed in Chapter 1?  It is important 
to highlight each of the issues of specificity and discuss them in the light of the New Zealand 
case and the results we have obtained in the present research.  There are four elements to the 
specificity of agriculture that we discuss here: the nature of demand, cyclical supply, asset 
mobility and climate. 
 
First, it is generally admitted that demand is inelastic to price in developed countries.  This is 
certainly true within the context of domestic demand in New Zealand. But it is not necessarily 
the case with regard to the demand for the whole New Zealand farm output which have a 
large proportion of products exported to international markets.  Therefore, the individual 
farmers who face a perfect inelastic demand for their products28 sold on the domestic market 
may not face conditions of inelastic demand on the international markets. 
 
Organisations that sell farm products on international markets, previously public Marketing 
Boards and now private companies, have power and the will to counter the characteristics of 
demand.  Fonterra, the organisation that operates as the exporter of New Zealand dairy 
                                                 
28 In the context of competition where there is a large number of small farmers in comparison with the size of 
the market, it is really the aggregate supply of all farmers that faces an inelastic demand, and not the individual 
supply of one farmer. 
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products on the international market, can thus practice control of supply and price 
discrimination according to the capacity of each market.  These are definitely some of the 
practices used to maximise the receipts obtained from the markets where demand is inelastic. 
Zespri Group International uses the same instruments to maximise its export receipts, just as 
in the sheep meat sector where there is a consortium of companies sharing the different 
markets and co-ordinating their actions. 
 
Thus, despite a context of generalised deregulation of the New Zealand economy, Marketing 
Boards maintain their power of exclusive or major seller on the international markets.  In that 
sense, the state regulation framework is still in force in New Zealand for the Marketing 
Boards and this is always justified on the basis of the characteristic of inelastic demand.  
However, this inelastic demand does not refer to the global international market but rather to 
each national sub-market that constitutes it. 
 
The second characteristic of the farm sector is that supply is generally cyclical in the short 
term but maintained in the long term.  New Zealand farm products are selling on a number of 
distinct markets which do not behave in the same way or in the same timeframe, and this 
reduces the cyclical effect of prices.  For example, in the sheep sector, New Zealand paid 
dearly for its large subordination to the United Kingdom market when that country joined the 
EC29.  But now, New Zealand has diversified its export markets, so that the diversity balances 
adverse prices on any one particular market.  In the dairy sector, the change in prices on the 
world market is not strongly characterised by cyclical behaviour because it is dependent on 
the national dairy policies of the large producer countries such as the EC and the USA, and 
above all their level of export subsidies. 
 
With regard to maintaining supply in the long term, even in periods of economic difficulties, 
the analysis indicates that it has been maintained during recent years.  Nevertheless, this 
assertion is not true for each type of production but rather for the farm sector as a whole.  In 
fact, sheep production has been decreasing but other production sectors, including dairy, beef, 
and fruits and vegetables have been increasing.  Thus since 1986, despite the abolition of the 
transfer payments and the difficult economic conditions, the volume of agricultural exports 
has not decreased. 
 
A lack of mobility of assets involved in farming is the third characteristic of the farm sector.  
It is this characteristic that seems to be the most useful in our analysis.  The mobility of assets 
towards the off-farm sector was relatively little.  As we have seen, despite the particularly 
difficult economic conditions in the sheep sector, the exit from farming was less than 
expected.  Having said that, many sheep farms (the only ones for which we have relevant 
data) have resorted to external sources of funds.  In particular, off-farm incomes have 
increased appreciably and this implies a relative mobility of a part of the human resources 
involved in farming families.  However, this process is quite different from the exodus of this 
resource from the farm sector. 
 
On the other hand, the farm sector has demonstrated considerable capacity for internal 
adjustment.  There has been a considerable movement of resources from one production 
sector to another.  This movement of resources could be easily facilitated by the fact that 
sheep and beef production uses approximately the same set of resources.  The change from 
one to the other does not require significant investments, other than changing the type of 
livestock. For example, pastoral agriculture turned towards dairy production. But this does not 
explain all of the adjustments: there has also been diversification towards non-traditional 
                                                 
29 Now European Union. 
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production of deer, angora goats (without any success in this case) and horticulture.  Thus, the 
production process has moved towards increasing productivity, and to control and reduce 
production costs.  In this way, the family organisation of production has shown its capacity of 
resistance to declining prices and above all its adaptation to lower returns from its resources. 
 
The exposure of the farm sector to climatic conditions is the fourth important characteristic of 
the nature of farming.  The New Zealand farm sector is no exception in this matter.  It is 
relevant to note however that in this matter, the government intervened by ad hoc 
programmes but with very small budgets. 
 
The combination of the four characteristics of the farm sector that we have just discussed is 
used to justify the institution and the maintenance of agricultural policies of stabilisation and 
support of prices and incomes.  Although these policies have been abolished in New Zealand, 
the effects on the farm sector in the medium-term do not seem to have been catastrophic.  
Nevertheless, the New Zealand farm sector is also affected, as in other countries, by the 
destabilisation effect of these characteristics, even if they do not impact with the same 
intensity as in other developed countries.  In this case, is there anything specific in New 
Zealand which is not present in other developed countries which might explain the lack of 
need for state intervention? 
 
First, the historical conditions are different from elsewhere.  In a country where the farm 
sector has until recently been the mainspring of the economy and of exports, the issues of land 
occupation and food security have less importance.  An island country located at more than 
2,000 kilometres from its nearest neighbour does not have any significant threat to its territory 
that needs to be resolved by means of land occupation.  Also, a country that exports about 85 
per cent of its dairy products, 95 per cent of its sheepmeat and 80 per cent of its kiwifruit does 
not have to consider the question of its food security.  Just as in other developed countries, the 
importance of farm employment and the essential part of the farm sector in the balance of 
payments of the country have played a role in the growth of support expenditure to this sector 
which began in the middle of the 1970s.  But the economic and political environment in 1984 
and 1985 led to the removal of support expenditure which had only been manifested by 
significant intervention for a relatively short period of New Zealand’s history.  Thus the first 
specificity of New Zealand in comparison to other developed countries is the historical 
conditions that led other countries to permanent government intervention in the farm sector, 
but did not lead to pronounced financial intervention in the New Zealand case. 
 
What more fundamentally explains the specificity of New Zealand is the capacity of the 
production process in pastoral agriculture to be based solely on the world price for its 
products while ensuring that the farming population receives an appropriate standard of 
living.  In the dairy sector, for example, the farm gate price in New Zealand is just more than 
half that of the Northern Hemisphere countries.  At this price, New Zealand dairy farmers 
have been encouraged to increase their production during recent years.  In the sheep sector, 
the withdrawal of transfer payments led to a significant liquidation of livestock and a major 
reallocation of resources.  But the farmers remaining in sheep production succeeded in 
stabilising the level of their income in real terms from 1987.  We did not make an 
international comparative analysis of production costs which included New Zealand.  It is 
very probable that such a study would illustrate the competitive capacity of the New Zealand 
farm sector and would explain its marked presence on the international markets despite its 
distance from these markets. 
 
Finally, do the characteristics of the farm sector in New Zealand justify specific intervention 
by the state?  It seems that the answer is no, but as the case of New Zealand is itself specific, 
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the results obtained in the present research should not be directly generalised to other 
developed countries.  However, the large capacity of the family organisation of farming to 
adapt to changing economic conditions has been clearly demonstrated by the analysis of the 
New Zealand case.  It is probably at this level that some analogies can be established with the 
farm sector situation in other developed countries.  Thus, three elements of the present 
research merit attention.  First, the mobility of resources away from the farm sector was 
relatively unimportant in the New Zealand case. Second, farmers adapted rapidly and 
efficiently to the new economic environment by modifying the use of their resources in order 
to mitigate the decrease in their incomes and to maintain their standard of living.  Third, the 
long-term trends that were already apparent before the implementation of the new policies, 
including structures of production and farm incomes, were not dramatically modified by the 
reform of policies and the economic crisis suffered by the farm sector.  Are these results only 
relevant to the New Zealand farm sector, with its unique specificity, or are they related to 
some characteristics of family organisation of farming that are not specific to New Zealand?  
If the latter is the case then the implications of the results from the present research would 
have some relevance outside New Zealand. 
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